Πώς ο πόλεμος στο Ορμούζ άνοιξε τον δρόμο για αγωγούς υδρογονανθράκων από τον Κόλπο προς την Τουρκία διαμέσου... Κουρδιστάν!
Yourvibe
And when it does, a rare window for bold collective action will open.
By Amos Hochstein
April 7, 2026
Whatever the outcome of the war with Iran, it has already delivered a lesson the world cannot afford to ignore. A single regime has decided to exert control over a 21-mile passage, and as a result, we are living through the worst energy crisis the world has ever seen.
The near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz has removed 9 million to 10 million barrels of crude oil from global markets each day, but that is only the beginning of the economic damage. The present crisis is worse than the Arab oil embargo of 1973, and broader than the Russian gas cutoff that followed the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Roughly 20 percent of the world’s daily supply of liquefied natural gas is gone. Five million barrels a day of refined products—the diesel that moves goods, the jet fuel that keeps aircraft flying—are missing. So are the fertilizers on which farmers rely to feed billions, the helium used to manufacture semiconductors and run hospital MRI machines, and the petrochemical feedstocks that underpin modern manufacturing.
The governments of Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Pakistan have already adopted a four-day workweek to conserve energy, and others will follow. Malaysian and Indonesian factories are reducing capacity. Airports across Asia are limiting flights—not because fuel is unaffordable, but because there is so little to be had. The petroleum derivatives that form the materials of daily life are disappearing.
The vulnerability of the global energy supply to Iranian coercion cannot be remedied by any military operation, diplomatic cease-fire, or drawdown of strategic reserves. The only long-term solution is new infrastructure—making a massive, internationally coordinated investment in energy corridors that bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely.
Just two major pipeline systems are currently capable of moving Gulf energy to global markets without going through the Strait of Hormuz, and they are running near or at their maximum capacity. Both carry crude oil, but not the refined products the world is running out of. And a substantial portion of the Gulf, possessing some of the world’s most significant hydrocarbon reserves, has no bypass route at all.
If the United States—and the world—wants to avoid a recurrence of the present crisis, it will need to help double the capacity of the two pipelines that exist, build refined-product infrastructure alongside them, and construct a new corridor for the producers who have none.
Saudi Arabia’s Petroline is today the single most important piece of energy infrastructure on the planet. The 746-mile pipeline, running from the eastern oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, was built during the Iran-Iraq War precisely to avoid an Iranian embargo, and it is performing as intended. But this single pipeline, even operating at maximum capacity, cannot meet demand. It requires additional trunk lines, expanded pump stations, and greater port capacity at Yanbu.
More important, the world is short not only on crude oil; it is desperately short on petroleum products. Crude pipelines do not move diesel or jet fuel or the liquefied petroleum gases that hundreds of millions of people use to cook their food. Those products will require their own dedicated infrastructure built alongside the expanded crude pipeline—separate lines, separate terminals, and separate investment.
The United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) connects inland oil fields to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, completely circumventing Hormuz. The vision behind the project, which became operational in 2012, has been vindicated every day of this crisis. But with a capacity of roughly 1.7 million barrels a day, it leaves some 40 percent of UAE production without a bypass option. Fujairah already has the geographic advantages and port infrastructure to become the world’s most consequential energy hub outside the strait. But first, the pipeline would need to have its capacity doubled, along with new lines added for refined products.
The third infrastructure challenge is the most urgent and the least discussed. Kuwait’s and Iraq’s southern oil fields, which contain enormous reserves that are crucial to global supply, do not have access to any bypass route. They are entirely exposed; almost every barrel they produce must transit Hormuz. The solution is constructing a modern, high-capacity pipeline corridor of oil, natural gas, and products from southern Iraq and Kuwait northward through Iraqi Kurdistan to the Ceyhan export terminal on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. A version of this route—the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline—already exists, but it is aging, its capacity is far below what is required, and its administration is politically fractured.
In both the Obama and Biden administrations, I spent years on diplomatic efforts to advance this concept, shuttling between Baghdad, Erbil, and Ankara, and producing little progress. Today’s crisis presents an opportunity to resolve the political differences that blocked such efforts in quieter times. The project is technically achievable but requires the political will, international financing, and American diplomatic leadership necessary to bring Turkey, the Iraqi central government, the Kurdistan Regional Government, and Kuwait to the table.
The current energy crisis is a problem for the whole world, so finding a solution cannot be left to the Gulf States alone. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have already demonstrated extraordinary foresight—the Petroline and ADCOP exist because their governments made long-horizon investments against risks that markets would never have funded. The nations of Europe, Asia, and the Americas that depend on Gulf energy have an interest in ensuring that similarly forward-looking investments are made today.
And it’s specifically in the interest of the United States to take the lead in such efforts, rather than lead a void that other actors—in particular, China—may seek to fill. The U.S. can help convene the Gulf States, the nations that consume energy, multilateral development banks, sovereign wealth funds, and private capital. The goal would be to make a strategic investment in shared global infrastructure—the same logic that animated the Marshall Plan, which was driven not by charity but by a recognition that a stable and prosperous world benefits America. Working through the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation in coordination with the World Bank, the U.S. could help anchor a broader coalition. When America puts capital on the table and sets the terms, others follow.
Consider what years of patient, unglamorous infrastructure investment have delivered in the recent past. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a long-predicted energy crisis failed to become catastrophic thanks to a decade of little-noticed work: The Southern Gas Corridor brought Caspian gas through Georgia and Turkey into Southern Europe; LNG terminals built in Poland, Lithuania, and Greece ramped up imports; pipelines had their flows reversed to move gas in new directions. The infrastructure built before the crisis made the difference when it finally came. The same logic produced the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve after 1973 and the International Energy Agency, which have helped buffer every major supply shock since, including this one.
The U.S. has already recognized the utility of building infrastructure through the region, helping to launch the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) to bypass choke points and connect rail, energy, fiber-optic cables, and hydrogen pipelines from India through the Gulf to Europe. Building the capacity to bypass Hormuz could be seen as IMEC’s most urgent energy component.
Some environmentalists oppose this sort of massive new investment in fossil-fuel infrastructure, arguing that it will slow the clean-energy transition. That objection misreads reality. Over the past 20 years, the world added more renewable-energy capacity and electric transport than almost anyone predicted possible—and yet fossil fuels still represent roughly 80 percent of the global energy mix, the same share as in 1980. Energy demand is growing faster than the supply of renewables can meet.
More fundamental, oil is not simply a fuel. It is the feedstock for plastics, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, and synthetic materials that electricity cannot replace. Natural gas is the backbone of the petrochemical and fertilizer industries. Airlines do not run on wind power. Hospital MRI machines do not run on solar panels. Accelerating the transition is not only necessary; it is vital and worth pursuing—and the supply chains of the present must be secured simultaneously. They are not competing priorities.
Sooner or later, the Hormuz war will end, and a rare window for bold collective action will open. The question then will be not just what infrastructure gets built—but also on whose terms and through what alliances. The United States knows how to build the infrastructure of a more resilient world, and has helped do so before: in the Caspian, in the decade of European energy-security work that preceded and then survived Russia’s invasion, in IMEC, and in Central Africa’s Lobito Corridor. And now it also knows, more vividly than ever, what it costs not to do so.
About the Author: Amos Hochstein served as deputy assistant and senior advisor for energy and investment to President Biden, and as special presidential coordinator for global infrastructure and energy security. He is a managing partner at TWG Global and a distinguished fellow at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.
Source: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/04/hormuz-strait-solution-infrastructure/686710/
[iEpikaira: Έτσι λοιπόν ο πόλεμος στο Ορμούζ άνοιξε τον δρόμο για αγωγούς υδρογονανθράκων από τον Κόλπο προς την Τουρκία διαμέσου... Κουρδιστάν, του οποίου η de jure ανακήρυξη έρχεται εκ νέου στο προσκήνιο.
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| Αγωγός προς Αλεξανδρέττα |
Ο αγωγός Κουβέϊτ-Ιράκ-Κουρδιστάν-Τσεϊχάν αποτελεί άλλη μια "τυχαία" πρόταση του ανοικτά φιλότουρκου Άμος Χόκσταϊν -αρχιτέκτονα του χάρτη Μπάιντεν ΕΔΩ-, ο οποίος θεωρεί ότι ο πόλεμος στο Ιράν αποτελεί ιδανική ευκαιρία για να μεταφερθεί το φυσικό αέριο του κόλπου στο Τσεϊχάν της Τουρκίας. Ας σημειωθεί ότι το Τσεϊχάν είναι δίπλα στην Αλεξανδρέττα (Ισκέντερουν), οπού επίσης φαίνεται να καταλήγει ένας από τους προτεινόμενος αγωγούς -πάλι από τον Χόκσταϊν- που ξεκινάει από τα ισραηλινά κοιτάσματα φυσικού αερίου και διέρχεται από την κυπριακή ΑΟΖ (περισσότερα ΕΔΩ).
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| Χάρτης αγωγού προς το Τσεϊχάν από Economist, 2009 |
Και επειδή τίποτα δεν γίνεται χωρίς σχεδιασμό... Δείτε και σχετικό δημοσίευμα του Economist από τον Μάιο του 2009 (!) στο οποίο υπάρχει χάρτης που προωθεί την πρόταση Χόκσταϊν για αγωγό προς Τσεϊχάν διαμέσου Κουρδιστάν! Παρακάτω η σχετική αρθρογραφία από τον τουρκικό τύπο...]
Iraq seeks 4-fold increase in Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline capacity: Türkiye
ISTANBUL Jul 14, 2026
Iraq has requested that the capacity of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline be nearly four times its current flows under a proposed one-year interim agreement with Türkiye, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said Monday.
The decades-old pact that governed exports through the Iraq-Türkiye Crude Oil Pipeline is due to expire on July 27. Bayraktar said last week that the sides are set to sign a 12-month agreement in the coming days to keep the pipeline open.
Türkiye had submitted a draft of a new long-term agreement to Baghdad, but negotiations had been delayed amid Iraq's elections and the formation of a new government.
Bayraktar said the process had made it unlikely that a comprehensive deal could be concluded before the current pact expires.
"As an interim solution, we proposed signing a one-year oil transportation agreement ... so that flows do not stop on July 27," he told reporters after a Cabinet meeting.
He said the Iraqi side requested capacity of 750,000 barrels per day (bpd), compared with current volumes that stand at around 180,000 to 200,000 barrels per day.
"We said, 'That's fine, we will allocate 750,000 barrels per day to you.' Within that year, we want to sign a new and more comprehensive Iraq-Türkiye Crude Oil Pipeline agreement," he said.
Bayraktar said he discussed broader energy cooperation with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi during a visit to Baghdad last week, including the extension of the pipeline to Iraq's southern oil hub of Basra and increasing its capacity to 2.5 million barrels per day.
He said Türkiye proposed opening the route to additional regional crude supplies.
"We said that if Kuwait wants to ship its oil through this pipeline, it should be able to do so. If others in the Gulf want to use it, they can as well," Bayraktar said.
"We also discussed building a natural gas pipeline alongside it so Qatari gas or other regional gas sources could be transported," he added.
The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has been at the center of a long-running legal dispute between Türkiye and Iraq. A Paris-based arbitration court ruled for Ankara to pay $1.5 billion over what it said were unauthorized exports by Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) between 2014 and 2018.
Türkiye, on the other hand, said the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) had recognized most of Ankara's demands.
Bayraktar said enforcement proceedings continue in Washington, where reciprocal claims and accrued interest will be calculated before determining whether either side owes compensation.
"There will be calculations, including interest, because our claims also date back many years. Once that is completed, the 2014-2018 period will be closed," he said, adding that arbitration covering the period after 2018 remains ongoing.
He said the arbitration cases would form part of broader negotiations with Iraq and that several issues related to the proposed one-year agreement have yet to be resolved, while stressing Türkiye is ready to proceed once the remaining issues are settled.
Türkiye halted oil flows through the pipeline following the devastating February 2023 earthquakes, citing damage to the infrastructure. Operations resumed after repair work in September 2025.
However, exports were temporarily disrupted again during the Iran conflict before restarting on March 18.
Source: https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/iraq-seeks-4-fold-increase-in-kirkuk-ceyhan-pipeline-capacity-turkiye
Iraq prepares to restart Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, launches Basra extension
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| Map shows Iraq’s oil pipeline network, including the Kirkuk-Ceyhan route and the planned Basra-Haditha line linking export corridors to Türkiye, Syria and Jordan. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s pipeline to Ceyhan remains operational. (Image via S&P Global Commodity Insights) |
May 01, 2026
Iraq is closing in on restarting crude shipments through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline while rolling out a major new pipeline project linking Basra to Haditha, extending oil exports to Türkiye, Jordan and Syria, Iraq's oil ministry confirmed on Friday.
An official statement indicated that maintenance and repair work on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line is in its final phase, setting the stage for exports to resume soon at up to 600,000 barrels per day.
Damaged part of Kirkuk pipeline set for comeback
The ministry highlighted that the pipeline’s return as a key step in strengthening Iraq’s export flexibility, calling it a strategic alternative route that would support the stability of national oil flows.
The line, which has a design capacity exceeding 1 million barrels per day (bpd), suffered extensive damage in 2014 following Daesh attacks, the ministry noted.
Flows through the Kurdish Regional Government’s pipeline linking to Ceyhan will also continue at around 400,000 bpd since resuming in March during the Hormuz crisis.
Basra-Haditha line to unlock 2.5M bpd export capacity
At the same time, Iraq has kicked off work on the Basra-Haditha pipeline, a large-scale infrastructure project designed to expand export capacity across multiple routes, with total costs expected to reach $5 billion once fully operational.
The planned 700-kilometer pipeline is expected to carry up to 2.5 million bpd once completed. It will link southern oil fields with export terminals across three directions: Türkiye’s Ceyhan port, Syria’s Baniyas, and Jordan’s Aqaba.
The first phase of the project carries a $1.5 billion price tag, with work already underway. However, ministry spokesperson Sahib Al-Bazoun made it clear that progress will hinge on securing sufficient financial allocations.
Completion timelines depend on budget approvals expected to be handled by the next Iraqi government, which is set to finalize procedures aimed at speeding up implementation.
As shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has nearly come to a halt since the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran began on Feb. 28, most of Iraq’s oil exports have been cut off.
Before the war, the country exported around 3.4 million bpd, but that volume has dropped by about 80% to roughly 800,000 bpd, despite Baghdad receiving an exemption from Iran to transit the strait.
Once finished, the Basra-Haditha pipeline is expected to significantly diversify Iraq’s export network, allowing crude to move through multiple regional routes and reducing reliance on any single corridor, Bazoun added.
Source: https://www.turkiyetoday.com/business/iraq-prepares-to-restart-kirkuk-ceyhan-pipeline-launches-basra-extension-3219195
[iEpikaira: Υπό το πρίσμα των ανωτέρω εξηγείται επίσης και η ανακοίνωση του ψευδοκράτους για αγωγό φυσικού αερίου από την Τουρκία προς τα κατεχόμενα. Διότι ένας αγωγός δεν κατασκευάζεται εάν δεν έχει πρώτα εξασφαλισθεί η δυνατότητα πλήρωσής του με υδρογονάνθρακες οι οποίοι είναι πλέον φανερό από που πρόκειται να εισαχθούν.
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| Χάρτης Μπάιντεν: Αγωγός φ/α από το κοίτασμα «Αφροδίτη» στην Τουρκία |
Εκτός τούτου, όπως ήδη σχολιάσαμε ΕΔΩ, ο νέος αγωγός προς τα κατεχόμενα αποτελεί το πρώτο βήμα για την μελλοντική σύνδεση των κοιτασμάτων της Κύπρου -ενδεχομένως και του Ισραήλ- διαμέσου της Κύπρου, όπως προβλέπεται επίσης από τον χάρτη Μπάιντεν. Ο εν λόγω χάρτης λοιπόν, απ' ότι φαίνεται, συνεχίζει να υλοποιείται βήμα-βήμα και θα μας απασχολήσει έντονα... Περισσότερα ΕΔΩ και ΕΔΩ!]
Α. Χόκσταϊν
ενέργεια
ΗΠΑ
Ιράκ
Ιράν
Κουβέιτ
Κούρδοι
Κύπρος
Μπάιντεν
πετρέλαιο
Τουρκία
φυσικό αέριο
Four Seas Project
IMEC
LNG
σχόλιο iΕpikaira
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