Murat Yeşiltaş
22 December 2023
Describing 2023 as a relatively quiet year for Turkish foreign policy would exclude the events of Oct. 7 and their aftermath. The trend of normalization, ongoing since the general elections in May, played a pivotal role in determining the overarching course of foreign policy. Despite unresolved issues, emphasis was placed on minimizing potential conflicts and prioritizing common interests. In the post-election period, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opted for a regional foreign policy centered on Gulf country relations, making the economy a primary focus. To mitigate security risks from Syria, ministerial-level talks with the Assad regime were initiated. Noteworthy strides were made in normalizing relations with Israel and Egypt. Erdoğan’s robust support for Azerbaijan in liberating Karabakh bolstered Türkiye’s status as a geopolitical player in 2023.
Erdoğan also sought to mend Türkiye’s ties with the West, aimed to chart a new course in Turkish-American relations and maintained a balanced stance in the Ukraine conflict. The year concluded with the pivotal Türkiye-Greece summit, marking another significant foreign policy step.
Moving into 2024
Turkish-American relations are poised to dominate the discourse in 2024 due to several unresolved issues. Foremost among these is the persistent U.S. support for the PKK terrorist group’s Syrian wing YPG. Notably, no substantial shift is anticipated in the U.S. strategy for Syria, indicating continued support for the YPG in northeastern Syria. This ongoing support poses a growing challenge for Türkiye as the YPG strengthens its military capabilities and international networks. Recent actions, like the implementation of a so-called new constitution renaming the region as the Democratic Administration of Northern Syria, highlight the urgency for Turkish action. Failure to address the YPG issue in 2024 could escalate into a broader strategic challenge for Türkiye. Furthermore, other facets of Turkish-American relations suggest an eventful year ahead. Positive developments in F-16 sales and a favorable decision by Türkiye’s Parliament regarding Sweden’s NATO membership could influence the military and defense dimensions of Turkish-American relations.
However, dynamics such as Israel’s war in Gaza and Türkiye’s stance on this matter might impact Turkish-American relations negatively. The prospects of an imminent reconciliation between Israel and Türkiye appear dim, potentially introducing an adverse element into Turkish-American relations.
Regarding Türkiye-Europe relations, 2024 is expected to extend the tone set in 2023. The European Union dimension may not witness a revitalization, but the post-election atmosphere is likely to persist. The ongoing Ukraine conflict holds significant sway over Türkiye-Europe relations, demanding a strategic approach from Türkiye given the uncertainties of the conflict’s trajectory. While security concerns, notably migration, reinforce the rationale for cooperation, economic interdependence indicates stable Türkiye-Europe relations in 2024. The reconciliation between Türkiye and Greece and their increasing collaboration in the Eastern Mediterranean energy domain is poised to impact Türkiye-Europe relations positively. However, the rise of far-right ideologies in Europe might influence national politics and foreign policies, potentially leading to anti-Türkiye sentiments within the European Union. Hence, developments in this realm warrant close monitoring.
The ongoing Ukraine war remains one of the foremost international concerns in 2024, significantly affecting Türkiye due to its proximity and vested interests. The pivotal question revolves around whether the U.S. and European countries will sustain military aid to Ukraine. Continuation of such aid ensures Ukraine’s capacity to sustain the conflict, while a cessation could alter the war’s course, potentially favoring Russia. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy stands to be influenced by the potential outcomes of the Ukrainian conflict. Erdoğan’s recent statements during his visit to Hungary and the prospect of a renewed summit between Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin underscore the importance of issues such as the grain corridor agreement. Given Türkiye’s multifaceted relationship with Russia in Syria, South Caucasus, Libya and energy, Türkiye-Russia relations will remain a critical focus in 2024.
In the Middle East, normalization will persist as a crucial element of Turkish foreign policy. However, the term “normalization” between Türkiye and the Gulf countries may become obsolete, indicating a burgeoning consensus on this front. A new regional consensus might emerge, uniting Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, especially in defense cooperation, potentially evolving into a strategic alliance. Despite this, the unresolved Gaza issue could engender a broader environment of instability in the Middle East in 2024, affecting Türkiye and the entire region. Consequently, countries, including Türkiye, may redirect more efforts toward Gaza.
Central Asia holds another significant dimension for Türkiye in 2024, especially concerning relations within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Initially focused on economic cooperation, this partnership is expected to evolve into a more strategic political venture, prompting Türkiye to pursue a foreign policy that secures its position in the Central Asian equation.
Overall, Türkiye’s strategic environment will be characterized by dynamism and diversity, culminating in a somewhat constraining regional atmosphere that ultimately poses challenges to Türkiye’s new regional and international orientation.
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Source: Daily Sabah, 22 December 2023 accessed https://www.setav.org/en/turkiyes-foreign-policy-in-2024/
