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The Erosion of American Primacy on the Eve of an Emerging Multipolar World

The international system is undergoing a redistribution of global power. But there is a tendency among observers to confuse two fundamentally different developments: the erosion of American predominance and the emergence of a genuinely multipolar international order. The first is increasingly evident. The second remains far from established.

Edited by iEpikaira

The distinction is important because the international system is not transformed simply because the leading power encounters difficulties, suffers setbacks or finds its freedom of action constrained. A new distribution of power requires something more: the emergence of additional states capable of challenging the leading powers across several strategically important dimensions. Weakening the incumbent does not, by itself, create an alternative centre of power.

The almost six-month record of the Global Power Shift Index (GPSI), covering 73 countries and five dimensions of national power (Economy, Military, Energy, Diplomacy, Technology), offers an interesting picture of this transition. Its most revealing finding is not simply that the United States and China are moving closer. It is that the overall hierarchy remains remarkably resistant to change even as the strategic position of individual countries fluctuates considerably.
Figure 1. GPSI scores for 73 countries at the beginning and end of the observation period. Each country's final score is plotted at its initial ranking position, illustrating changes in relative scores rather than final rank order. Note: The data presented in the dashboard is restricted. The GPSI_History_Workbook is not publicly distributed. Access may be granted on a case-by-case basis, subject to the publisher’s discretion. Requests: iepikaira@gmail.com

Three countries continue to occupy the summit: the United States, China and India. The distance between the first two has narrowed considerably, but the gap separating them from the rest remains substantial. No additional country has crossed into the highest tier. Meanwhile, the average position of the 73 countries monitored has changed very little.

This is not the profile of a world in which power is already widely dispersed. It is the profile of an international system in which the existing hierarchy is becoming increasingly contested.
Figure 2. The gap is closing at the summit — not across the system. Evolution of GPSI scores for the United States, China and India, compared with the average score of a fixed group of seven countries: Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, Norway and Canada. These countries occupied positions 4–10 in the GPSI ranking on 9 June 2026. Thin lines represent daily observations; thick lines show trailing seven-day averages. Note: The data presented in the dashboard is restricted. The GPSI_History_Workbook is not publicly distributed. Access may be granted on a case-by-case basis, subject to the publisher’s discretion. Requests: iepikaira@gmail.com

The United States: Declining Freedom of Action
The most important development in the GPSI record is the deterioration of the American position relative to China. Washington remains the dominant power in the overall ranking, but its margin has contracted. Crucially, this convergence has occurred primarily because of a weakening American trajectory rather than a dramatic acceleration in China's.

That distinction has considerable strategic significance.

A leading power does not lose its position merely because another country becomes stronger. It also loses ground when the cost of maintaining its international position rises, when commitments accumulate and when its ability to translate superior resources into favourable political outcomes becomes less reliable. The developments recorded in the GPSI help illustrate the problem. 

American power is global, but American resources are not unlimited. Every major commitment competes, directly or indirectly, with other strategic priorities. A confrontation in one region can affect military readiness, diplomatic credibility and the resources available for deterrence elsewhere.

This is one of the central dilemmas confronting a global hegemon: maintaining predominance requires commitments across multiple geographical theatres, yet those same commitments can progressively constrain the freedom of action that makes predominance possible.

China and the Advantage of Strategic Patience
China's position presents a different picture. Its trajectory has been considerably more stable in comparison to USA's. It has not displaced the United States, nor has it established an uncontested position across all the dimensions of power. Nevertheless, it is benefiting from the narrowing distance between the two leading countries.

Beijing does not need to surpass Washington immediately to improve its strategic position. It needs to remain sufficiently powerful to resist American pressure, protect its essential interests and make the exercise of American power more costly.

This is a fundamentally different proposition from global hegemony.

The competition between the two countries is not confined to military capabilities. Economic capacity, energy security, technological independence and diplomatic influence are becoming increasingly interconnected. The American effort to restrict China's access to advanced technologies illustrates how competition in one domain can have consequences across the entire strategic relationship.

China's relative resilience is particularly significant because it does not depend on spectacular advances in every field. A relatively stable position becomes advantageous when the principal competitor is experiencing greater volatility.

In strategic terms, Beijing gains bargaining power even without gaining first place. Washington must increasingly calculate the costs of confrontation, the possibility of escalation and the consequences of diverting resources from other priorities.

But China still faces a fundamental constraint: being the United States' principal competitor is not the same as possessing the ability to replace the United States as the global organising power. Its growing economic and technological weight has not yet translated into equivalent influence across every region or dimension.

The emerging competition is therefore better understood as a struggle over the future distribution of power than as an accomplished transfer of global leadership.
Figure 3. Changes in normalized economic, military, energy, diplomatic and technological GPSI scores between June 9 and November 18, 2026. The broadest losses are concentrated in the United States, Russia and Iran, while gains elsewhere are more selective. Note: The data presented in the dashboard is restricted. The GPSI_History_Workbook is not publicly distributed. Access may be granted on a case-by-case basis, subject to the publisher’s discretion. Requests: iepikaira@gmail.com

The Illusion of a Third Pole
India's position is particularly instructive. It remains firmly established as the third-ranking country, but the distance separating it from the leading pair is still considerable.

India possesses important advantages: geographical depth, a large economy, a significant military establishment, technological ambitions and considerable diplomatic flexibility. Its ability to maintain relationships with competing powers also gives it strategic room for manoeuvre.

Yet none of these characteristics automatically makes India a third global pole for the time being.

A country becomes a great-power centre not simply because it possesses considerable resources, but because it can convert those resources into sustained influence across several regions and strategic domains. India's position is important, but the GPSI record does not suggest that it has reached the same level of comprehensive power as the United States or China.

The same caution applies to the broader idea of a rising Global South. It is tempting to treat countries dissatisfied with the existing international order as members of an emerging alternative coalition. This is analytically misleading. Their interests are frequently incompatible, their strategic priorities differ and their relationships with Washington and Beijing remain highly transactional.

India's interests, for example, cannot simply be equated with those of Russia, Iran, Brazil or Turkey. Nor does opposition to particular American policies imply a willingness to participate in a common geopolitical project.

There is no automatic mechanism through which dissatisfaction with American predominance becomes an organised multipolar order.

Russia and Iran: The Limits of Resistance
The deterioration of Russia and Iran further complicates the argument that an alternative geopolitical centre is taking shape.

Russia's declining position is particularly revealing. Moscow retains a formidable nuclear arsenal and substantial military capabilities–some of which is yet to be revealed. It nevertheless faces growing difficulties in converting these assets into broader economic, diplomatic and strategic influence.

The GPSI event record reflects the pressures associated with the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, battlefield attrition and the increasing importance of external military assistance. Reports concerning North Korean military involvement illustrate an important contradiction: Russia retains the ability to mobilise partners, but its reliance on external assistance also reveals the constraints under which it operates.

The distinction between possessing military power and exercising it effectively is crucial. Military capabilities can impose costs on adversaries, but they do not automatically generate economic strength, diplomatic influence or a favourable international position.

Iran faces a different but related problem. Military pressure, restrictions on energy flows and the continuing danger of renewed confrontation have weakened its broader strategic position. Tehran retains significant regional disruptive capabilities, but the ability to threaten or destabilise is not equivalent to the ability to establish a durable regional order.

Neither country has become strategically irrelevant. However, their declining trajectories undermine the assumption that opposition to American power necessarily produces a stronger alternative international centre.

A state can challenge the established order without possessing the resources to replace it.

Regional Powers and the Politics of Opportunity
The GPSI trends of Ukraine and Turkey demonstrate another important feature of the emerging system: the growing opportunities available to regional actors.

Ukraine has improved its relative position through military adaptation, battlefield innovation and diplomatic mobilisation. Its development of drone capabilities and continuing efforts to secure external military support have increased its strategic relevance.

Turkey has also registered selective improvements, particularly in its military and diplomatic dimensions. Its geographical position, defence-industrial development and ability to maintain relationships with competing powers provide Ankara with considerable regional leverage.

But these developments should not be confused with the emergence of new global poles.

Ukraine's strategic position remains closely connected to the war and the external assistance it receives. Turkey has greater regional manoeuvrability, but it does not possess the comprehensive economic, technological and military reach required to become an equivalent centre of global power.

The same distinction applies to European countries and the principal Indo-Pacific western allies. France, Britain, Germany, Japan and South Korea retain considerable capabilities, but their relative positions have remained broadly stable. Improvements in their rankings are partly attributable to the deterioration of other countries rather than a corresponding transformation of their own strategic weight.

The important development, therefore, is not that these countries are replacing or competing the leading top powers. It is that a less uncontested international environment creates opportunities for states with sufficient resources, geographical advantages and strategic flexibility to pursue more independent policies.

A Transition Without a New Equilibrium
The aggregate GPSI distribution offers perhaps the strongest evidence against the premature declaration of a multipolar world. Despite substantial movements among individual countries, the overall hierarchy has changed surprisingly little. The leading pair (US-China) remain isolated at the summit, the secondary tier has not closed the distance, and most countries have experienced only marginal changes.

This suggests that the international system is undergoing a redistribution of strategic momentum without a corresponding redistribution of global power on the same scale. That distinction should inform how the current transition is understood.

A genuinely multipolar system requires several independent centres capable of sustaining substantial economic, military, technological and diplomatic power. They must also possess the capacity to influence events beyond their immediate geographical surroundings and to resist pressure from the other leading powers.

The GPSI record does not yet demonstrate the emergence of such a configuration.

What it reveals instead is a more competitive international system in which American predominance is becoming increasingly difficult to exercise, China is acquiring greater relative leverage, India remains a substantial but distant third power, and regional actors are exploiting opportunities created by the changing strategic environment.

The resulting order may be less predictable, more transactional and more prone to regional competition. But it is not yet one of equivalent global centres of power.

The central danger is to mistake the weakening of the existing hierarchy for the disappearance of hierarchy itself. The United States may no longer be able to impose its preferences as readily as before, but that does not mean that another country or coalition is ready to assume its position.

The old order is losing some of its authority before a new equilibrium has emerged. The United States is becoming less dominant; China is becoming more competitive and thus more difficult to constrain; and other powers are finding greater room to manoeuvre. Yet the distribution of capabilities remains heavily concentrated at the top.

The world is not yet multipolar. It is entering a more unstable transitional phase: the erosion of an established hierarchy while the contours of the post-war international order remain fiercely contested.
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