[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. REGIONAL
PRIORITIES
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND
TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 8, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-220
(Committee on Foreign Affairs)
Serial No. 114-90
(Committee on Science, Space, and Technology)
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., ZOE LOFGREN, California
Wisconsin DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
DANA ROHRABACHER, California DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
RANDY K. WEBER, Texas DON S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
STEVE KNIGHT, California PAUL TONKO, New York
BRIAN BABIN, Texas MARK TAKANO, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas BILL FOSTER, Illinois
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia
GARY PALMER, Alabama
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
DARIN LaHOOD, Illinois
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Energy
HON. RANDY K. WEBER, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
STEPHAN KNIGHT, California ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Amos J. Hochstein, Special Envoy and Coordinator for
International Energy Affairs, Bureau of Energy Resources, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 10
The Honorable Jonathan Elkind, Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy............... 17
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Amos J. Hochstein: Prepared statement........................ 13
The Honorable Jonathan Elkind: Prepared statement................ 19
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 44
Hearing minutes.................................................. 45
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
U.S. REGIONAL PRIORITIES
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs and
Subcommittee on Energy,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
North Africa) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittees will come to order.
After recognizing myself, Chairman Weber, Ranking Member
Deutch, and Ranking Member Grayson for 5 minutes each for our
opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking
recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our witnesses. And, without
objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will be made a
part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert
statements for the record, subject to the length limitations in
the rules.
We are also expected to be joined by the chairman of the
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Chairman Smith,
and possibly Ranking Member--oh, here he is, right on time--and
possibly Ranking Member Johnson as well. Let me look over here.
No. So I will be pleased to recognize them as they arrive.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
Three months ago, I led a bipartisan congressional
delegation trip to Cyprus and Israel. I was joined by Carolyn
Maloney, Gus Bilirakis, and my friend and colleague from our
Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Randy Weber, who is
participating today as chair of the Science, Space, and
Technology Subcommittee on Energy. Energy was the focal point
of our trip, and one of the major talking points we heard in
both Israel and Cyprus was that the natural gas developments in
the Eastern Mediterranean has the potential to be more than
just an economic boost for both countries; natural gas
development has the potential to drastically change the
geopolitical landscape of the region for the better.
While in Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli
Government officials told us that the democratic Jewish state
was on the verge of reestablishing relations with Turkey, and,
indeed, just a few short weeks after our trip, Israel and
Turkey announced relations had been restored. No doubt the
potential to collaborate on natural gas developments played a
central role in those discussions.
Since the discovery of natural gas in the Eastern
Mediterranean, Israel's relationships with Greece and Cyprus
have improved. While in Cyprus, we were told that the Cypriots
are working to bring the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean
area together to create a multilateral forum that would include
Israel. We were told by Cypriot officials that they consider
themselves part of Israel's strategic depth and plan on working
closely with Israel on issues of counterterrorism, security,
crime, and trafficking. It was clear that energy has emerged as
a key incentive that can help resolve the Cyprus problem and
end Turkey's occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. A
potential pipeline carrying Cypriot and Israeli natural gas to
and through Turkey could not only improve relations in the
region, it could be then routed into Europe. That would help
our European friends in reducing their dependence on Russian
energy and decrease Russian influence in that area.
We have yet to see the tangible contributions from Ankara
regarding Cyprus reunification, an issue that is of utmost
concern to this committee. With cheap Israeli natural gas, we
can see Israel strengthening its relationship with Jordan and
Egypt and reshaping the traditional alliances in the region, as
both nations could benefit from alternative energy sources. So
the United States has a vested interest in seeing these
projects in the Eastern Mediterranean come to fruition in order
to bolster our partners in the region but to also bolster our
own national security interests.
Of course, the potential economic benefits realized by
Eastern European nations should all these natural gas projects
be developed would be immense. And it won't be just an economic
benefit to the Eastern European nations. It was the U.S.-based
company Noble Energy that made these potentially game-changing
natural gas discoveries offshore both Israel and Cyprus. Exxon
has also participated in Cyprus' latest round of licensing.
As the projects expand and come online, that will create
more jobs and bring in more revenue. But there are, of course,
still various important impediments in the way. It would
clearly be in Jordan and Egypt's benefit to work with Israel so
they can decrease their energy subsidies that heavily burden
their economy in lieu of a cheaper alternative, but will they
allow other political considerations to derail stronger
cooperation with Israel? Are energy incentives sufficient to
end Turkey's occupation of Cyprus, or will this opportunity
pass and limit the extent of energy cooperation in the region?
Is Israel ready to be a regional leader, and can it resolve its
domestic issues favorably to allow these projects to go
forward?
The United States can play a pivotal role in resolving some
of these issues. We want to hear what positive steps the
administration is taking to encourage these projects to go
forward and how, if at all, we are providing support to Israel,
to Cyprus, Turkey, Egypt, and Noble Energy even, to get these
ambitious projects online and benefiting the region. We want to
know how these issues factor in the administration's foreign
policy when it comes to these nations and the region, because
the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries can
drastically reshape the region and benefit so many of our
allies.
And, with that, I recognize Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes. And I will then recognize the other members and
ranking members. And I know that Ranking Member Bernice
Johnson, Chairman Smith, and many others will be speaking as
well.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman, for holding
today's hearing. Thanks to Chairman Weber and Ranking Member
Grayson. And thank you to the witnesses for being here and for
the good work that you and your agencies do.
Energy security is an integral part of stability in a
volatile part of the world. Recent gas finds in the Eastern
Mediterranean present opportunities for new relationships and
unprecedented cooperation between regional actors.
I co-chair the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance with
my friend Congressman Gus Bilirakis, whom I saw walk in just a
moment ago, who joined Chairmen Ros-Lehtinen and Weber on their
recent delegation to Israel and Cyprus. Much of the work that
we do in the caucus is focused on energy cooperation, and we
have seen the way that these gas finds have really brought
these three countries together and deepened their relationship
in a really meaningful way.
These are countries that have so much in common, including
a respect for and commitment to democracy, and now have an
opportunity to work together to create energy independence for
their own countries, to help their neighbors meet their rising
demands, and to eventually bring this gas to new markets.
The trilateral meeting earlier this year between Israel,
Cyprus, and Greece resulted in the establishment of a
commission to explore possibilities for a pipeline to Europe.
Getting this gas to Europe will go a long way toward decreasing
Europe's energy dependence on Russia. And, from a national
security perspective, helping Europe diversify from pro-Western
sources can help contribute to increased international
stability. Cyprus' discovery of the Aphrodite field in 2011 was
the catalyst for the serious discussion of a pipeline
connecting the Eastern Mediterranean gas fields. Unfortunately,
the stalled reunification talks have hampered that planning
process. I know that both sides are hopeful that talks can
conclude before the end of the year, giving way to a new era of
cooperation. Many have speculated on the role that energy
played in the recent rapprochement between Turkey and Israel,
and I hope that Special Envoy Hochstein will speak to how this
development impacts Cyprus, as well, and how the current
instability in Turkey affects prospects for regional
cooperation on a pipeline.
For Israel, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields
are a game-changer. Since the Tamar field went online, natural
gas now accounts for 30 percent of Israeli fuel consumption, up
from 11 percent in just 2008. Production from the Leviathan
field has the potential to more than meet all of Israel's
natural gas needs, leading it to be an exporter in the future.
Israel also appears to finally be on the road to overcoming the
regulatory challenges that have stymied progress over the past
several years. Her neighbors have recognized this potential for
a stable gas source. Memoranda of understanding have been
negotiated with Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority
for various gas deals.
Following the uprisings in Egypt in 2011, Jordan faced
serious disruptions to its gas supply as terrorists in the
Sinai repeatedly attacked the Arab Gas pipeline from Egypt. A
pipeline from Israel to Jordan has been approved to facilitate
a $15 billion agreement between U.S.-based Noble Energy, the
developer of Israel's fields, and Jordan's national electric
power company. Noble Energy also spearheaded a 2014 deal to
bring gas to the West Bank. And just this week, Israel
announced a partnership with the Dutch to help supply gas to
Gaza. Cooperation that brings about benefits to the people,
real benefits that impact their daily lives, like alleviating
water and gas shortages, can go a long way to reducing tension
on the ground. Noble has also signed an agreement with an
Egyptian firm for an undersea pipeline.
Now, it is no secret that relations between Israel and its
friendly neighbors should be strengthened. I hope that the
Governments of Jordan and Egypt continue to withstand domestic
pressure to cancel these deals. Both of these countries are in
desperate need of new energy sources, and these deals can
provide much-needed relief.
Egypt, once a net exporter, has two LNG facilities that
have not operated at capacity for several years, and the rise
in domestic demand decimated Egypt's ability to export. If
these facilities are able to be secured, they would be ideal
for use by Cyprus. Egypt's surprising discovery of the Zohr
field, the largest find in the Eastern Mediterranean, adds a
new dimension to the regional aspect. Egypt is hopeful that gas
from Zohr can reach domestic markets by 2017, and, depending on
demand, the ability to export in the future could provide a
much-needed boon to Egypt's economy.
Mr. Hochstein, I hope that we can discuss in greater detail
how the Zohr discovery fits into planning for the future of
Eastern Mediterranean gas.
And with all the activity in the Eastern Mediterranean,
there is a real opportunity here for the U.S. to use our
expertise to provide technical and political support to these
countries as they move forward.
And, finally, Madam Chairman, you and I partnered to
introduce and pass the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act in
2014. I know we are both proud of this legislation that
showcased the depth and breadth of the U.S.-Israel
relationship.
And one area that this bill made remarkable advances in was
energy. In addition to authorizing a dialogue and a number of
new energy initiatives and expanding grant programs, the bill
authorized the establishment of a joint U.S.-Israel energy
center in the United States that would leverage the experience,
knowledge, and expertise of all that we have here in the United
States and in Israel and move toward the development of
domestic resources to address needs. And I want to stress that
this showcases just how much there is for our two countries to
do together and the substantial impact this kind of research
can have around the world. And it is the kind of thing that
doesn't get enough attention. And there is a lot more I haven't
touched upon that I hope we have a chance to get into and hear
from the witnesses, especially how U.S. energy imports are
impacting these developments around the world and Iran's
reentry into the energy market.
I thank our witnesses and you and look forward to a
fruitful discussion.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And we are so thrilled that the full committee Science
Chairman and Ranking Member, Smith and Johnson, have joined us
today.
And Lamar is the only one who knows that my childhood
nickname is Lily, so he is a good friend.
The chairman is recognized.
Mr. Smith. I thank the chairwoman for working with the
Science Committee to host today's hearing. Our shared
jurisdiction over international energy issues is an important
piece of U.S. foreign policy. I look forward to our discussion
on the appropriate roles of the Department of Energy and
Department of State.
Today, the Subcommittee on Energy and the Subcommittee on
the Middle East and North Africa will examine the opportunities
for energy development in the Eastern Mediterranean. We also
will discuss how cooperative research and development with our
allies can bolster U.S. diplomacy and provide opportunities for
new scientific discoveries.
While the State Department's responsibility to execute U.S.
foreign policy is well-known, the Department of Energy's Office
of International Affairs also plays an important role in
foreign policy. DOE describes the purpose of its International
Affairs Program as integrating the Department's research
programs, national labs, and science and technology policy to
pursue U.S. Government objectives on energy and national
security issues. The Department also provides subject matter
expertise and vital information on the impact energy
development can have on global stability and security, which is
of interest to our national security agencies.
DOE currently engages on energy issues with dozens of
countries. Its agreements include bilateral R&D partnerships
and multilateral efforts on regional energy issues that range
from energy efficiency and oil and gas exploration to providing
electricity to rural communities around the world. By working
to ensure energy security for our allies, the U.S. can engage
in diplomacy that improves regional stability and increases
innovation.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, energy issues have a
significant impact on regional security. The United States has
a long history of engagement in the region, particularly in
support of one of our closest allies, Israel. On energy issues,
DOE has led cooperative research efforts with Israeli
scientists for decades, with formal agreements on energy
research dating back almost 30 years.
Programs such as the Binational Industrial Research and
Development Foundation and the Israel-U.S. Binational Science
Foundation encourage collaboration between the nations' top
labs and scientists. These programs research a broad range of
topics that include oil and gas exploration, production, and
distribution technologies, energy efficiency and renewable
energy, and water desalination and treatment facilities.
The U.S.-Israel Energy Dialogue, reestablished by DOE in
2011, fosters scientific engagement on cybersecurity, civil
nuclear energy, and basic research and development activities.
These programs leverage DOE national labs and researchers to
produce the kind of scientific collaboration that can lead to
the next technology breakthrough.
The recent discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields
off the coast of Israel have the potential to foster new
regional trade relationships. It could even provide a source of
natural gas for U.S. allies in Europe. DOE-led cooperative R&D
for natural gas production, transmission, and distribution can
help drive this development. It can create the potential for
Israel to become a net exporting country, establish energy
trade with its neighbors, and ensure Israeli energy security
for years to come.
I thank our witnesses, Assistant Secretary Elkind and
Special Envoy Hochstein, for testifying today. We look forward
to their comments about the role DOE plays in support of U.S.
diplomacy and opportunities for energy engagement with allies
in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Thank you, Madam Chair, for that recognition. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith.
And now we would like to turn to Ranking Member Eddie
Bernice Johnson, who is recognized.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
And good afternoon to all.
I am so appreciative of you holding this joint hearing on
energy opportunities in the Middle East and, in particular, on
the research and development partnerships in the region.
DOE's international partnerships span the globe, and they
are an important tool in expanding clean energy innovation and
addressing climate change. One of the strongest partnerships we
have is with Israel. Our Nation and the state of Israel have a
long history of cooperation in developing clean energy
technologies and in promoting and ensuring energy security for
Israel in particular. This relationship is not only in each of
our national interests but vital for our shared commitment to
the region as well.
The U.S. supports a number of successful initiatives to
promote this collaboration. The DOE's Office of Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy has issued awards for research
in wind, solar, energy storage, and many others. These funds
are matched by the Israeli Government and the awardee, allowing
for greater leverage on every dollar DOE invests.
In addition to DOE's work with Israel, the Department has
also collaborated with industries in Turkey to employ better
energy-efficiency practices and technologies. These
partnerships strengthen our country's own R&D efforts and make
a positive impact on our diplomatic work in the region. If we
wish to continue to promote scientific advancement in energy
security, great collaboration in research and development must
continue to be a high priority.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel on
the progress we have made in this area and on the opportunities
we should turn to next.
I thank you and yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Ranking Member
Johnson.
And now I would like to turn to Chairman Weber, who is the
chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon, and welcome to today's joint subcommittee
hearing examining energy opportunities in the Eastern
Mediterranean. I want to thank my colleagues on the Committee
on Foreign Affairs for working with the Science Committee to
hold this very important hearing.
Today, we will have an opportunity to receive an update on
U.S. diplomacy and regional energy development and will conduct
important oversight of the Department of Energy's ongoing
cooperative research and development programs with our allies
in the region. We will specifically hear about DOE's energy
engagement with Israel, the key U.S. ally in the region.
The Department of Energy plays a vital role in ensuring
global energy security. By engaging with our allies through
energy, environment, and technology cooperation, DOE provides
opportunity for international researchers to access the
scientists and the research infrastructure at our national
labs. It also gives U.S. researchers the chance to work with
new partners on innovative research and opens the door for
future discoveries and technology breakthroughs. This kind of
collaboration provides opportunity for international dialogue
and directly supports U.S. diplomatic efforts around the world.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, our strongest ally is Israel.
So it should be no surprise that DOE has a long history of
cooperation with Israel, or what I call the start-up nation, on
energy research and technology development. Starting with a
research partnership that was formalized in 1987, the
Department has consistently prioritized this strategic
partnership.
Energy security is a key priority for Israel, and not just
for Israel. It directly contributes to regional stability. By
enabling Israeli development of their natural resources,
including the sizable Tamar, Dalit, and Leviathan offshore
natural gas deposits, the United States can promote economic
growth and help establish trade relationships between Israel
and its neighbors, which will mean stability in the Middle
East. Noble Energy, a U.S. company based in Houston, Texas,
helped discover these gas fields. And today, the ongoing
research partnership between DOE and Israeli scientists will
provide technical expertise and the technologies to help
successfully develop and export this resource. With regional
partnerships to develop pipeline infrastructure, Israel's
natural gas resources could even fuel Europe, serving as an
alternative to Russian natural gas and providing energy
security even to more U.S. allies.
Now, look, DOE is engaging with Israel on renewable energy,
cybersecurity, desalination--I can do this, I can do this,
Madam Chair, I know, I know--and energy storage technology--my
``tang is getting tongled''--cybersecurity, and efforts to
protect our critical infrastructure. Maintaining this dialogue
in cooperation with our key ally should remain a U.S. priority.
In the past year, we have even seen DOE take a leading role
in negotiating U.S. international agreements. In the case of
the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement, my
colleagues and I have raised very serious concerns. So I am
pleased to discuss DOE engagement, where we see clear benefits
from the U.S. and our allies and the potential for real
breakthroughs in energy technology.
I want to thank Assistant Secretary Elkind and Special
Envoy Hochstein--am I saying that right? Good enough? Okay--for
testifying to the committees today. Your testimony will provide
a valuable update to Congress on the impact of energy on
regional stability and how your respective departments can best
engage to support our allies and advance U.S. goals.
By supporting cooperative research and development with our
allies, the Department of Energy can contribute to U.S.
diplomacy, the security of those allies, and promote
groundbreaking energy research, all the while helping to ensure
a more stable region in the world. I look forward to you two
gentlemen laying out the framework to do just that.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Weber.
And now I am pleased to yield to my Florida colleague,
Ranking Member Grayson, for his statement.
Alan?
Mr. Grayson. Thank you.
I actually don't have anything to add to my colleagues and
what they have said already, but there is something I want to
emphasize, and that is the importance of this development to
peace in the Middle East. The opportunity for peace is based
upon a very fragile concept called personal safety and
security. There is no peace unless people feel that they are
not in danger. And that is a requisite on all sides--on both
sides, and on all sides.
Israel has felt for decades now that there is a noose
around its neck regarding its energy supplies. And these are
fragile. In the modern world, energy supplies are corporatized
and centralized from the well to the pump and everywhere in
between. And the result of that is that there is a
vulnerability intrinsic to the energy supply system that is not
necessarily the case with regard to the supply of food or the
supply of shelter or other basic necessities.
It is, actually, similar to the bottleneck that we see with
the Internet. Last night, I saw the movie ``Snowden.'' In the
movie ``Snowden,'' they illustrate this point by pointing out
that the entire Internet service in Syria was shut down
inadvertently by a cyber attack--inadvertently.
And the same thing can be true with energy supplies. Energy
supplies are centralized in a manner that makes them uniquely
vulnerable. And as long as Israel, as long as other countries
in the region feel that they are vulnerable in that regard, it
is difficult for people to even grasp the concept of peace.
We lived through similar circumstances decades ago in the
United States. I can well remember how the shutdown of oil
supplies and oil imports to the United States led to my parents
getting up at 5 o'clock in the morning, along with many, many
other Americans, in order to get their gas in the morning and
waiting online for hours in order to make that happen. I can
also remember how the quadrupling of oil prices, worldwide oil
prices, led to the deepest postwar recession that we had until
the year 2008. In the same way, countries like Israel, other
countries in the region feel vulnerable to similar attacks on
their economy, on their safety, on their way of life. And as
long as that is true, then it's unreasonable to expect anything
resembling peace.
So what we have here, through the discovery of natural gas
supplies that are fortuitously spread around the Eastern
Mediterranean in areas that Israel can possibly exploit, Egypt
already is exploiting, Lebanon might be able to exploit, Cyprus
is already exploiting, that creates a common interest in peace
and security and a sense of safety that is absolutely necessary
if we are going to see a peaceful Middle East at any point in
time.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ranking Member
Grayson.
I would be glad to recognize any members for opening
statements they would like to make for a minute.
Mr. Bilirakis is recognized.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. And thank
you for allowing me to sit in on this very important
subcommittee. Thanks for holding it as well.
I also want to thank Chairman Weber and Ranking Member
Deutch and Ranking Member Grayson and members of the
subcommittee, again, for inviting me to participate in the
joint subcommittee hearing concerning the increasingly
important energy priorities in the Middle East and the Eastern
Mediterranean regions.
When I co-founded the Congressional Hellenic-Israel
Alliance Caucus, along with my friend Representative Deutch,
one of our primary goals was to promote the growing partnership
between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus--a partnership which could
yield important economic and national security benefits for the
United States and the region.
Energy diplomacy has been at the core of that partnership.
Noble Energy's 2010 discovery provided a great surge in
optimism that natural gas cooperation would provide energy
security, economic growth, and global stability in a
notoriously unstable region. Exclusive economic zones were
established quickly and with minimal friction. Energy
cooperation resulted in security cooperation, greater Israeli
tourism to Greece and Cyprus, and projects like the Euro-Asia
Interconnector.
If this cooperation continues and expands to include other
regional actors, natural gas could bring the region together
the way coal and steel brought Europe together after World War
II. The energy potential of this region furthers the U.S.
interests by making allies and strategic partners energy
independent, by helping Greece and Cyprus out of their economic
crisis, by stabilizing Egypt and Jordan, and by incentivizing
Turkey to avoid destabilizing behavior in the region. That is
why we need to focus today on how the U.S. is both furthering
cooperation in the region and working to overcome obstacles.
Turkey's ability and willingness to play a positive role in
a stable Eastern Mediterranean must be determined. Without a
decisive and tangible move toward ending its occupation of
Cyprus, Turkey--one of the greatest beneficiaries of an Eastern
Mediterranean energy region--remains one of the greatest
obstacles to this promising future.
I want to thank the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
Northern deg. Africa and the Subcommittee on Energy
for highlighting this important issue for the stability and
security of the Middle East.
And I yield back. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Bilirakis.
Seeing no other requests for time, I am so pleased to
welcome our panelists.
We are delighted to welcome back Mr. Amos Hochstein, who
serves as Special Envoy and Coordinator for International
Energy Affairs for the Bureau of Energy Resources at the
Department of State. Prior to this role, Mr. Hochstein served
as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Diplomacy and even a
former staffer of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
You survived that; you can go to a lot of places. So
welcome back, Amos.
Next, we would like to welcome to our subcommittee for the
first time, but hopefully not the last time, the Honorable
Jonathan Elkind. Mr. Elkind is the Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs with the Department of Energy. Prior to
that role, Mr. Elkind served as the Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary. And prior to joining the State Department, he was a
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Welcome, Assistant Secretary Elkind.
As I said, your remarks will be made a part of the record.
Please feel free to summarize.
And we will begin with you, Mr. Hochstein.
STATEMENT OF MR. AMOS J. HOCHSTEIN, SPECIAL ENVOY AND
COORDINATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF ENERGY
RESOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Hochstein. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is good to be
back where it all started for me 20 years ago. So I appreciate
that.
Madam Chair, Ranking Members, Chairman, I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today to discuss energy developments and
opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
But let me start here at home to frame it. The United
States has transformed into the world's energy superpower. That
is true in oil, gas, wind and solar, efficiency, and R&D.
We have increased oil production from 5\1/2\ million
barrels a day to nearly 9 million barrels a day and
transitioned from being a significant and increasing importer
of natural gas to an important exporter. By the end of the
decade, the United States may match Qatar in export volumes of
LNG.
We have seen investments in U.S. renewables rise to $58
billion in 2015 alone and increased solar generation more than
twentyfold in the last 8 years. Any way you use the word
``energy,'' the United States is the leader, and the world is
looking to us for leadership.
This is a time of turbulence for global energy markets, due
in part to the transformation taking place in the United
States. As you know, oil costs less than half what it did 2
years ago, and prices for gas in Europe and Asia are at
historic lows. Energy is also again playing an increasing role
in geopolitics.
But today we are here to discuss the Eastern Mediterranean.
Discoveries offshore Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, and potentially
Lebanon have already redefined regional relationships and, I
believe, will continue to be a catalyst for increased economic
and political cooperation through interconnection and
integration.
For example, many credit regional energy development for
the deepening of the relationship between Israel and Cyprus and
Greece. The successful exploration, production, and export of
natural gas resources in the Eastern Med will require exactly
the political cooperation and economic integration that the
United States has long supported in the region. This remains a
top foreign policy priority for the United States, which is why
I have spent a significant amount of my time devoted to these
opportunities and why engagement by Vice President Biden and
Secretary Kerry on these issues has been so robust.
Let me start by describing the current landscape in the
Eastern Med. In January 2009, Noble Energy discovered the Tamar
gas field offshore Israel, containing approximately 7 TCF of
gas. The next year, they discovered the Leviathan field, with
approximately 18 TCF of gas. The Israel discovery spurred
exploration in nearby Cyprus, where Noble discovered Aphrodite
in 2011, with an estimated 4\1/2\ to 5 TCF of gas. That
increased interest in the region, coupled with positive
developments in Egypt's investment climate, led to additional
exploration in Egypt, yielding Italian firm Eni's Zohr field
discovery, mentioned earlier, with approximately 30 TCF, making
it the largest discovery to date in the Mediterranean.
Eni's discovery of the Zohr field, which lies just south of
Cyprus' EEZ, sparked renewed interest in exploration offshore
Cyprus, which had been waning after the Aphrodite find because
a number of exploration wells did not produce significant
discoveries. Cyprus just concluded an extraordinarily
successful third bid round, with bids from companies including
ExxonMobil, Qatargas, and others. This cycle of exploration and
development in the region will continue as long as discoveries
continue to be made, expanding potentially to places like
Lebanon and Greece.
I believe the Eastern Med remains an underexplored and
underdeveloped area, and I fully expect that significant
discoveries will continue to be made there. However, the market
is still looking for validation that historical political
differences will not get in the way of investment and
development.
One of the early lessons learned in the development of
Eastern Med resources is the critical importance of regulatory
certainty, a business climate that is conducive to investment,
contract sanctity, and close cooperation between the government
and the private sector. The lack of regulatory clarity and
stability cost Israel years in development of its largest
offshore resource. But despite early challenges, I am now
optimistic and confident in the long-term stability of energy
development in the region.
Let me be clear: Energy will not solve political
differences in the region, but it can and, in fact, already has
provided incentives to accelerate political accommodation and
encourage compromise.
The future I see for the region includes new and old
pipelines connecting Israel's offshore resources to Jordan,
Egypt, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. It includes
Cypriot gas exports to Turkey and/or Egypt, allowing Egypt to
satisfy its own power needs and export via existing but now
idle LNG terminals. New resources will allow Turkey to
diversify its heavy dependence on a small number of suppliers
and use its extensive pipeline network to reach Europe as well.
The success of all these plans, however, hinges on
cooperation. Countries will save billions if they share
infrastructure and market access. If they don't share these
resources, most of the gas will have to stay in the ground. The
importance of these developments is not isolated to the Eastern
Mediterranean but it is part of a broader energy security
puzzle, connecting dots from Jerusalem to Nicosia, Athens to
Baku, from Baghdad and Irbil to Sophia and Belgrade and Kiev.
The Eastern Mediterranean can play a role in freeing
Central and Southeast Europe from their overwhelming dependence
on Russian gas. Turkey has the potential to transform from a
country with a heavy reliance on Russian energy to a critical
hub connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This is an
exciting opportunity to enhance prosperity, economic security,
stability, and political security.
That is why we have made this a top priority for the United
States. I don't believe that this vision of increased national
security through energy security is wishful thinking. We are
seeing it become a reality today.
I thank you, and I look forward to your questions, Madam
Chair. Thank you again for inviting me to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hochstein follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Welcome back.
Mr. Elkind?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JONATHAN ELKIND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Elkind. Thank you, Madam Chair, Chairman Weber, Ranking
Member Deutch, Ranking Member Grayson, distinguished members of
both subcommittees. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today.
My name is Jonathan Elkind, and, as has been stated, I am
the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S.
Department of Energy. My office advances U.S. objectives in
international energy security, national security, and clean
energy deployment by applying DOE's knowledge of energy
technologies, markets, and policies.
Let me provide some context at the outset in regard to
natural gas in particular. This is a time of dramatic change,
as just has been noted, in global energy markets, and these
changes will be felt in the Eastern Mediterranean as well.
Decades of investment, both by the U.S. Government and private
industry, have produced a cascade of scientific and
technological advances which allowed us to unlock
unconventional gas and oil resources.
Pipeline systems have historically dominated natural gas
trade around the globe. However, new facilities to liquefy
natural gas, chiefly in the United States and Australia, are
rapidly changing this reality. In fact, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, or EIA, projects that global LNG
trade will exceed pipeline natural gas trade by 2020.
Together with an increasing reliance on shorter-term
contracts, natural gas markets are now characterized by greater
liquidity and competition, features simply not seen in the
past. The implications for the United States and for trading
partners and allies, such as Israel, are enormous: Greater
availability of clean-burning fuel, more security of supply,
greater ability to diversify one's purchasing.
In the Eastern Mediterranean region, one sees significant
new upstream prospects and competing proposals to monetize
those gas reserves by building pipeline and LNG infrastructure,
as my colleague Amos Hochstein has just sketched out.
Bearing in mind Israel's current consumption of around 300
billion cubic feet per year, Israel has sufficient gas supply
for 25 years while also allowing for exports. Companies working
offshore from Cyprus and Egypt, as has been noted, have also
made major gas discoveries.
When it comes to moving this gas to markets, a great deal
of attention has focused on regional pipelines, and some of
these projects have been called out already. There have also
been discussions not only about exports to Cyprus and to Greece
but then also to Turkey as well. One must remember, however,
that the development of multibillion-dollar natural gas
production and transportation systems requires transparent and
predictable legal and regulatory structures. The terms, in
short, must simultaneously attract investors and advance the
interests of the host countries.
Let me now turn briefly from the global and Eastern Med
natural gas issues to DOE's work with Israel on energy and
science issues. Our collaborations involve frequent Cabinet-
level engagement between the Secretary of Energy and Israeli
counterparts, as well as engagements among senior officials,
researchers, and experts through our annual U.S.-Israel Energy
Dialogue.
Here are some highlights of this effort.
One is collaboration on the energy-water nexus. Israel and
the United States both face the challenge of providing new
water resources and new energy production. So DOE and Israel's
Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy, and Water
Resources recently announced the U.S.-Israel Desalination
Design Challenge, a competition that encourages leading
engineers and researchers in the U.S. and Israel to design
integrated energy and desal systems.
DOE and the Israeli Ministry also recently announced a
U.S.-Israel postdoctoral exchange program, which will enhance
scientist-to-scientist cooperation between DOE-funded research
programs and Israeli scientists in energy-related topics of
interest.
Comments have already been made by several of the ranking
members and chairs about the BIRD, the Binational Industrial
Research and Development, Foundation and its energy component
in particular. BIRD Energy has approved 32 projects, with a
total of $21.6 million combined from the U.S. and Israeli
Governments and matching dollars on a greater-than-one-to-one
match from the private sector.
Energy cybersecurity is a top concern for both of our
countries and was a featured topic in the October 2015 U.S.-
Israel Energy Dialogue and was also a point of great focus when
Secretary Moniz visited Israel earlier in the current year and
spoke about this topic with the Israeli cyber coordinator, with
Energy Minister Steinitz, and with Prime Minister Netanyahu.
To institutionalize our energy research engagements, DOE is
now establishing a Virtual Center of Excellence for Joint
Research. And I would be happy to provide more information
about that in the question-and-answer, if desired.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be with you here
today. Thank you for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elkind follows:]
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----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you to both gentlemen for excellent
testimony.
We will begin our question-and-answer period.
Israel and Cyprus are both relatively new to natural gas
production. In Israel, we saw robust debate on the domestic
level as well as Supreme Court challenges, regulatory burdens
to overcome. Most of these have been cleared, but there are
still some disputes.
Cyprus is obviously ideally suited to be a focal point of
sorts for the region, with pipelines headed in all directions.
Cyprus can simultaneously be connected to Israel, Egypt,
Greece, Turkey, but not all of these connections will be
established at once.
So what comes first? What is the U.S. priority in that
region?
Mr. Hochstein. Madam Chair, I think you described it
correctly. And as the entire region has, as we articulated,
both Mr. Elkind and myself, the resources discovered in
different countries. If this was just about common sense and
you took out all politics and all the geopolitics, we would
have a great hub that was humming with pipelines going in
different directions and cooperation.
So I think when you ask the question, what comes first, I
think you have to look at where the advancement on geopolitics
is advancing in line with the technical and the economic
advances.
Noble Energy and its Israeli partners already negotiated a
deal with Jordan that started in 2012. And it started as quiet
discussions and ended up in a pipeline signing agreement that
will bring gas from Noble to two private companies at the Dead
Sea area in Jordan. That is already in construction now and
will be complete. That is a very small amount of gas, but it is
the first marker and, by the way, the first infrastructure
project that connects the two countries in a 20-year peace.
You now have a chicken and an egg. We have to get some of
the disagreements to move away. Israel has a pipeline that
connects it to Egypt, goes through the Sinai, as was mentioned
by several of the members. It was blown up, I think we are now
at 32 times in the last few years. It can be reverse-flowed so
it can take gas from Israel to Egypt, but it has a dispute over
it that is in international arbitration courts. So, until that
is resolved, it cannot be used. As was also mentioned, we can
have an offshore pipeline under the sea connecting it to Egypt.
I think what we have to see now with the normalization
between Israel and Turkey and if a solution can be reached on
the island of Cyprus that will allow the unlocking of the
ability to build a pipeline from Israel via Cyprus to Turkey,
as well as cooperation with Egypt to allow Israel to use and
have access not only to the Egyptian domestic market that is
still thirsty for gas but also for their idle LNG terminals
that can reach Europe.
So I have the same question; what comes first? We are
trying to work on all different fronts to see whatever can come
first. What is clear is that the United States needs to
continue to play an active role in trying to find what the
geopolitical solution is, find the stumbling blocks and remove
those, so that the private sector can find the economic
solutions to be able to move forward.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
And, Mr. Elkind, one thing that we don't hear too much
about when discussing the Eastern Mediterranean energy future
is the role of the Palestinian Authority.
Could you tell us, have there been any discussions in the
administration about the role of the PA in the Eastern
Mediterranean energy development and what would that role be?
And how do you deal with Israel and the PA while Hamas still
controls Gaza?
Mr. Elkind. Madam Chair, I am happy to start an answer to
that, but some elements of what you have just posed as a
question to me fit, I would say, perhaps a little bit more
naturally in the State Department's lane, so my colleague may
wish to add.
The discussions around the development of these resources
go to the monetization of the resource. These are, after all,
economic undertakings first and foremost. And without benefits
to simultaneously, as I said before, to the investors and to
the host countries, then the idea of these projects remains
theoretical and doesn't progress beyond that.
Now, the very obvious political difficulty that exists
between the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority is
one that I think nobody on any side hopes will persist any day
longer than absolutely necessary. On the contrary, a peaceful
settlement is in everybody's interest.
But the specific terms and the degree to which natural gas
resources from Israel's offshore would be provided to the
Palestinian Authority is something that is hugely sensitive, as
the chair will appreciate. There are from time to time
discussions about this, but I wouldn't feel it appropriate for
me to go farther than what I have said.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you.
And Mr. Hochstein?
Mr. Hochstein. There was an agreement that was signed that
would allow some of the offshore gas to come into the
Palestinian Authority to fuel a potential power plant in Jenin,
which would work for all sides.
Additionally, there is right near the original Noble
discovery, the smallest one, called Mari-B, there is a field on
the Palestinian side of the waters called Gaza Marine that is
owned by the Palestinian Authority and was leased out
originally to British Gas, which was purchased recently by
Shell. There is a strong interest to be able to develop that
field. I think we need some advancement on the politics to be
able to move forward, but it would be of great advantage both
to Israel and to the Palestinian Authority for them to be able
to develop that field.
Clearly, there would have to be cooperation, as the gas
would have to come onshore in Israel, not in Gaza, and then be
able to be fed into the Palestinian Authority territories. As
Ranking Member Deutch mentioned earlier, there was some reports
of a change toward a gas pipeline to Gaza. I think we are still
trying to work on that. This is a longer-term plan. But what is
clear is we want to be able to work with the Israelis on
identifying a way to get the Gaza power plant back online in a
way that both allows for electricity restoration in a reliable
manner, as well as allowing for it to be done in a secure
manner, from Israel's perspective.
We are also working with them on some renewable energy
options, which would allow the Palestinian Authority to spur
investment and economic activity. And my team will be out there
shortly to work with them on that.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you very much.
And one last question. Mr. Deutch had brought up the U.S.-
Israel energy center that was authorized in the U.S.-Israel
Strategic Partnership Act, a bill that Mr. Deutch and I worked
on which became law in December 2014. It has been nearly 2
years. Why has this not come online yet? And what needs to
happen to make it happen?
Mr. Elkind. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Indeed, this is something that we are working on
formulating right now. I will note simply as a statement of
fact that, while the bill did authorize the creation of the
center, there were no resources associated with that, and so we
have had to go through the exercise of identifying those
resources. We have now done so.
We think that there is a beneficial function to be played
by a virtual center that helps to create stronger ties between
researchers in Israel and in the United States. If you permit
me, I would note that this would build on literally decades of
such ties. My father, who at an earlier stage--well, when he
was still alive--at an early stage in his career was at both
Brookhaven National Laboratory and then Argonne National
Laboratory and, in his cancer research work, had exceptionally
close ties with collaborators from Israel.
So this is building on a very long and storied history. We
think there is more important work to be done, and we are now
working on doing precisely that.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Sounds good. Thank you so much.
Ranking Member Deutch is recognized.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much.
Just to follow up on that point, Secretary Elkind, this
virtual center that you described, there are now resources to
create it. Do you have a sense of when that might actually move
forward?
Mr. Elkind. So we have to work through some of the details
with our Israeli counterparts, and we have not done that yet.
But there was a prerequisite feature, which was to identify
resources, and that has now happened. So I expect that this
will be operational in 2017, but that is an estimate, it is not
a commitment.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. Thank you. Understood.
Mr. Hochstein, I know you recently traveled with the Vice
President to Turkey. This is a question perhaps for both of
you, but I will start with you.
Many of us have concerns about the direction that Turkey is
headed, and I am concerned about human rights and freedom of
speech, long-term security. But I want to believe that
President Erdogan understands the importance of regional energy
cooperation. And so I would ask, to what extent during your
visit did you discuss energy issues, including an Israel-Cyprus
pipeline?
I also just had a couple of followups. The recent repair of
relations between Turkey and Russia has revived talk of the
Turk Stream project that would carry Russian gas to Southern
Europe while bypassing Ukraine. And if that happens, are you
still committed to Turkey as an energy hub, or do other
routes--Egypt for one; potential pipeline from Israel to Cyprus
to Greece another--become higher priorities?
Mr. Hochstein. Thank you, sir. Yes, I did travel with the
Vice President, and I thank you, sir, for asking me the
question about the energy part of the discussion.
We did touch on the energy issues, as we have in previous
meetings in Turkey, in the Vice President's trips there and in
meetings in Davos. I think President Erdogan does understand
and I think the Energy Minister and Prime Minister have a keen
understanding of the advantages that energy security provides
for Turkey.
But let me connect the two pieces of your question. Turkey
today gets just above 50 percent of its natural gas from
Russia. It gets another piece from Iran as well. So the
vulnerability in the dependence on a Russian source is an
economic vulnerability that Turkey is keen to overcome. As a
result, you have seen an effort to diversify its resources,
one, through an intention to lease floating LNG terminals to be
able to import more from the market, and the second, embarking
on discussions around the region to see how it can diversify
its sources. The normalization with Israel obviously had a lot
to do with security issues, but the energy security piece was
clearly a critical role, as was stated by both countries
publicly.
But to complete that project, in order to be able to
realize the economic benefit of energy security from the
normalization, you have to have an agreement in Cyprus, because
the pipeline that would go from Israel to Turkey goes through
the EEZ of Cyprus. And I truly hope and believe that Turkey
understands the critical nature and the strategic nature or the
element that has been added in on the Cyprus discussions--that
is, energy.
But let me connect that to the second question on Turk
Stream. On the same day of the announcement of the
normalization with Israel, there was an announcement of
discussions between Turkey and Russia and then followed by a
meeting in Saint Petersburg on August 9 between the two
leaders. And Turk Stream was heavily featured in the press
releases coming out from Moscow. Turk Stream, or its
predecessor South Stream combined with Nord Stream 2, are the
Russian attempt and insistence on continuing to dominate their
monopoly in natural gas in a significant portion of Europe. The
Turk Stream that we are talking about now originally was four
pipelines that would replace Ukraine, the transit through
Ukraine, that would have a devastating impact on Ukraine. Turk
Stream today is, first of all, a discussion of one pipeline
that would essentially swap what Turkey gets from Russia via
the Balkans with a different route. So that is a little bit
different from the full Turk Stream that we had talked about in
the past.
Still, our view is that we don't need geopolitical projects
that Russia is financing as it is a national security threat to
Europe. So I think that there is a lot of room here.
Mr. Deutch. So, just going back to something you said
earlier in your answer, are you suggesting that President
Erdogan, understanding these regional issues, that the desire
to move forward on these energy issues may actually contribute
to the likelihood of reunification of Cyprus?
And if that happens, then, given the concerns about Russia,
does that become the focus of these energy discussions?
Mr. Hochstein. Like I said in my testimony, the energy
piece is not a replacement for solving geopolitical problems
and disputes that have existed for a very long time throughout
the region. What they do provide is an incentive, I believe,
and potentially a catalyst.
I do believe that all countries in the region--Turkey,
Cyprus, Greece, Israel--understand what the benefits would be
for energy security, cooperation, and prosperity if a solution
could be found in Cyprus. Whether or not one is going to be
found, I don't know, and there are others that are going to be
smarter than I am and more informed on that. But it is clear to
me that throughout the region there is an understanding of the
linkage between what the benefits are and would be for all
parties. And that is why I think we are at a critical time.
Mr. Deutch. And then, finally, Madam Chairwoman, if it is
okay, just to circle back, given the Zohr discovery and the
recent Cyprus-Egypt deal and the existing infrastructure in
Egypt, if a deal in Cyprus--if there isn't reunification this
year, does that make the Egyptian option essentially phase one
for the Eastern Med?
Mr. Hochstein. I certainly think that there can be multiple
phases here. I think it is not a zero-sum game. There is enough
gas already discovered in Israel and Cyprus and Egypt to allow
for gas to flow in both directions.
I think the cost is going to feature. So the cost of a
pipeline to Turkey via Cyprus through the island is far cheaper
than some of the other options, surely than the one that was
mentioned before to Europe, which is extraordinarily expensive.
So I think the economics do allow for both options. And I
think they compete a little bit differently, because one would
be LNG from Egypt to Europe or to the other parts of the
international market; to Turkey, it would be pipeline gas,
which is priced differently. So it provides even more
flexibility, more options for both Cyprus and for Israel.
Mr. Deutch. Great.
Thank you to both the witnesses.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Chairman Randy Weber is recognized.
Mr. Weber. Thank you.
Wow. You know, we have two LNG plants in my district in
Texas. I am kind of wondering maybe if Texas ought to just
annex Cyprus and take care of this whole issue, because we know
how to export LNG.
So many questions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Forget it.
Mr. Weber. Yeah, I know.
Mr. Hochstein, you said--I think it was you--in response to
the chairman's question, it is kind of a chicken and an egg
thing going on. Well, I would submit, if you can get gas
production and you can get somebody producing that gas, then
the egg will follow.
Because once one country gets that energy security--and you
can tell me, both of you gentlemen, if you think that is a
correct assessment--if you can just get your toehold in there,
if you can just start that production and get somebody
producing it, don't you think the other countries would see the
reliability, the affordability, and would follow suit and would
actually get in gear and do something?
Mr. Elkind, you look like you are----
Mr. Elkind. Well, Chairman Weber, we have seen around the
globe a lot of times instances where backbone infrastructure
that started--and you can look at Alaska as an example--helps
to spur other developments in a very constructive way.
But I go back to the comments about how the global natural
gas market is changing, and the story in your district is a
huge part of that. We are talking about a 40-percent increase
globally in the capacity to liquefy natural gas. And so this is
a competitive marketplace. And one of the conclusions that has
for the Eastern Med is that it is going to have to be investors
who are able to look at a long game.
So would initial success help? Yes, that has already
helped, if you look at the case of the early production
offshore Israel, which has brought a lot of benefits to the
state of Israel. But the market that surrounds the Eastern Med
is not simple. It is competitive. It is going to get more so.
Mr. Hochstein. So I think, to add just the element of the
chicken and the egg that I mean, so, of course, you are right.
If somebody starts developing the gas--Israel has developed
gas, but it is really for the domestic market. It hasn't yet
developed Leviathan. The reason they haven't developed
Leviathan is because they had all these concerns and they were
stuck in court and everything else.
Mr. Weber. Yeah.
Mr. Hochstein. They finally get rid of that issue, and we
are now ready, but here is the issue: A company like Noble or
any other company, in order to be able to approve and to commit
to billions of dollars of development of a field the size of
Leviathan, need to have some contracts for exports that will
allow them to justify the investment ahead of time. And that is
when you get to this chicken and the egg.
Mr. Weber. Well, I think that is what he called predictable
regulatory regulations to develop this--in your remarks.
Go ahead.
Mr. Hochstein. Yeah. So they now have the regulatory
system, but they need to be able to find markets to sell to.
They need to be able to conclude arrangements with Jordan or
Egypt or Turkey or others. Israel doesn't have its own LNG
facilities, and, therefore, it has to rely on a neighbor to be
able to get the gas to the international markets.
So when you say that doesn't one of them need to start
developing, they do, but they also need to be able to conclude
arrangements to sell it in order to be able to justify the
investment.
Mr. Weber. I am aware.
Mr. Hochstein. That is where we are coming in and trying to
figure out how do we help that process along, of removing the
geopolitical stumbling blocks to be able to have the economics
drive it.
Mr. Weber. Do you think that the unrest--well, it is
actually a two-part, I guess, as it pertains to Turkey.
The chairwoman, by the way, puts on an excellent
congressional delegation. If you want to go over there and
learn a lot, she is the ticket.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Lots of Halloumi.
Mr. Weber. And she likes the good cheese over there too.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. That is the cheese, not booze.
Mr. Weber. Yeah. I wanted to get that on the record.
Do you think that the--I mean, we were over there trying to
foster a better relationship between the Cypriot Greeks and the
Cypriot Turks, and then all this stuff happened in Turkey. So
now you have not just one unrest to deal with, you actually
have two.
Elaborate on how important you think the purported coup--
how long you think that is going to take to play out. Is it
going to have a long-term effect on these negotiations?
Mr. Hochstein. I really couldn't say the effect, the
political effect, of the post-coup environment. Obviously,
Turkey went through a devastating time of recovering from, you
know, a radical event that they see as their 9/11.
Mr. Weber. Well, then let me ask you a specific question,
if I can. I know that is broad and open-ended. Their Minister
of Energy--because I know there was, like, 60,000 people that
were kind of arrested and detained and spirited away, if you
will--was he or she one of them?
Mr. Hochstein. No. The Minister of Energy is still there--
--
Mr. Weber. Okay.
Mr. Hochstein [continuing]. And I speak to him regularly.
Mr. Weber. So, in essence, that line of communication is
still in place.
Mr. Hochstein. Yeah, I have not seen any disruption--since
those, you know, 50 days or so ago of the coup, I have not seen
any disruption in the energy relationship. And especially in
the region--the conversations, regionally, are continuing. I
have seen the Minister a couple times since then and spoken to
him on the phone almost weekly.
So I think that, while there is a lot of churn going on
politically in the country and they are trying to get back to
normal, on the energy front there has not been a change in
pace.
Mr. Weber. Okay.
And, Mr. Elkind, did you want to weigh in on that as well?
Mr. Elkind. Thank you, Mr. Weber.
The only thing that I would add to this that hasn't been
covered by Mr. Hochstein is a little bit of the long view.
We have been engaged with Turkey on these energy issues,
energy transportation issues, for a long time, back to the
1990s and the first development of the Caspian Sea resources
offshore from Azerbaijan.
And I would say it has been my observation from my time
inside government in the 1990s, outside governments, working
with some of the energy companies myself, that there have been
ebbs and flows in Turkish policy. There have been times where
our Turkish colleagues really, with a sense of incredible
purpose, moved forward on the kind of backbone infrastructure
that I was remarking on before. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline comes to mind, the South Caucasus gas pipeline.
I am confident that Turkey will continue to play that role
of being an important partner in this, in the energy projects.
I will leave the politics to others. But, again, I stress that
there have been ebbs and flows. There have been times where we
wondered, was Turkey still committed to this vision of being a
key link from----
Mr. Weber. A connector, if you will?
Mr. Elkind. Yes. And we will see. I think that that is
still where their intention is, but that is for the Turks to
determine and for them to show.
Mr. Weber. All right. Thank you.
And, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Weber.
I am so pleased to yield to Coach Perlmutter because he is
an outstanding Member of Congress, but his real claim to fame
is that he goes out there every morning with the congressional
women's bipartisan softball team and coaches us on to victory.
So thank you. He is recognized for all the time that he cares
to have.
Mr. Perlmutter. Well, now that I know your nickname is
Lily, you are going to be doing wind sprints when I say,
``Lily, hit it.''
No, thank you, Madam Chair, and it is a pleasure to
participate with your committee. And this is a fascinating
conversation, obviously very complicated. And, Mr. Hochstein,
when you talk about geopolitics, I don't know whether it is
geographic politics or geologic politics, because it is both.
And there are a couple big players in the region you haven't
talked about much: Iran and Saudi Arabia.
You also mentioned energy security and energy prosperity.
And I think we have to break this down into a couple, three
phases for me to even absorb anything you guys are talking
about: National security; sort of the foreign policy
international relationship, friendship, alliances; and then
global markets. Because at the price of natural gas today and
the price of oil today--which, you know, they sort of run in
tandem--there isn't much of incentive to develop expensive
fields in dangerous places.
And so the question then is, Israel developing for their
own domestic use and their own national security and maybe
working some of this, these pipelines and things like that, to
develop international friendships that they might not otherwise
have.
So I guess my question to both of you is, with Saudi Arabia
pumping into a glut and just having an oversupply, and the
demand has sort of stayed the same out there, so prices have
dropped, how do you see things developing? Has everything come
to a screeching halt at these prices? Or what actually is
happening out there, in this part of the world, as they are
trying to develop this new resource?
Mr. Elkind. Thank you, Congressman.
Has everything come to a screeching halt? Well, no, but
none of the companies that are involved in any of these
projects in any of the countries that you have mentioned can
afford to try to defy gravity. The market creates a backdrop
that is not favorable and friendly to the kind of large,
capital-intensive projects that we are talking about.
But the companies we are talking about also understand from
the beginning that these are multidecadal projects. And so they
take a long view that looks not only at today's price
environment but also an expectation of what that may be for 25
to 40 years. And that is where I think that there is a general
sense that, although we have this abrupt change that is
happening in natural gas markets right now, with new production
in the United States, first and foremost, but also in other
places around the globe--there is also a skyrocketing demand
for a natural gas as a lower-carbon and lower-polluting, in
terms of air quality, urban air quality, fuel.
So these companies that we are talking about, by their
nature, take the long view. They will look at today's reality
with a sense of caution. You will have read, of course, about
the reductions in capital budgets that almost every global
hydrocarbon company is experiencing right now.
I would say that it is not easy to be new to the
hydrocarbon business. And Mr. Hochstein commented before about
some of the bumps in the road that have been experienced as
Israel tried on various approaches to its interaction as a
state, with the investor. But we perceive that there is
progress that is being made. We are optimistic that this
necessity of creating a predictable pathway into which
companies can put enormous quantities of resources, of
investment, we think that this is on a much better trajectory
now, where we are optimistic because, at base, we hear optimism
from the companies.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you.
I mean, I guess--and my time has expired--but you have this
international, you know, cover that sometimes you have
alliances, sometimes you are fighting with each other over
there, and that is a political risk that any company has to
consider. So that is getting straightened out. So kind of to
Mr. Weber's question, you know, those kind of things are
getting ironed out.
But that price risk, that a Saudi Arabia can drive the
prices down in the 1980s and drive everybody out of business,
or they do the same thing at 107 bucks a barrel for whatever
their goal is, to increase their market share or to keep Iran
out of business or to try to shut the Russians down, that price
risk is going to be something that both the bankers as well as
the oil companies are going to say, whoa, you know, you have
the international risk tamed, but that price risk is too much
for us to overcome our worry.
That is what I see. But I was also a bankruptcy attorney
and did a lot of oil and gas bankruptcy, so that is kind of my
mindset on this.
Anyway, thank you very much.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Coach.
Mr. Neugebauer.
Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this
hearing.
You know, we have been talking about the increased capacity
in the region and, obviously, the increased capacity that is
happening domestically here in the U.S. And when you start
talking about that infrastructure, you know, I think I hear two
different dialogues going on. One dialogue is the ability for
those countries to export, you know, natural gas, but then the
other is the utilization domestically within their own
countries.
And I think, Mr. Hochstein, you mentioned that Israel had
gone from using, like, 11 percent natural gas to, like, I
think, was it 30 percent? Yeah.
So the investment to increase the distribution system
within their own country is a different investment than someone
coming in and wanting to build export capacity in there. Which
one of those are you all most focused on now?
Mr. Hochstein. Well, first of all, I think it is both.
Israel went through a process of very quickly increasing their
capacity. And recently--they have reached a certain limit due
to their existing infrastructure--but as recently, I think, as
last week, Minister Steinitz announced that they were going to
do more conversions of three additional coal plants to gas in
order to be able to take advantage of gas.
I think this is still an issue for them in their
negotiations with private sector, because the private sector
would like to have the guarantee of exports beyond--even if
there is an increase in the domestic market, they still want
the certainty of having the optionality of--if they are going
to be investing, again, in the $6 billion to $10 billion to $12
billion in developing this field, that they have access to the
broader market. So there is a cap there.
In Egypt, we are deeply engaged with the Egyptians on
trying to work with them on getting a better handle on the
power sector. Because they are such a historic gas producer,
they had most--all their power comes from gas, and they ended
up with plateauing their production, but their demand increased
significantly.
So they had power shortages in the summer during Ramadan
over the last several years. This past summer is probably the
best summer they have had, and partly due to a lot of
engagement by bringing in some American companies to do
emergency power--with GE, and Siemens was there as well--but
also thinking through what is the investment strategy
domestically.
Egypt is interesting because, as a result of actually
changing the investment climate, meaning being willing to
increase the price that they are going to be buying the gas,
they ended up with, immediately upon doing that, significant
new investments, in the billions of dollars. The Zohr field
discovery was done as a result of that, as was BP's onshore
discoveries. They also increased their ability to transform
from an exporter to an importer and bought first one, then
another, LNG floating terminals to be able to import gas, and
are looking to--with us and how we can work with the Ministry
of Electricity and Power--to rationalize the inefficiency in
the power sector so that they can get more with less. But they
have had a real struggle in that capacity.
So, even with the discovery of Zohr, 30 TCF, which is the
largest in the area, that still, even if it comes online, won't
be enough to cover the domestic market, which means there is
still an ability to take Israeli gas or Cypriot gas, deliver it
to the LNG terminals in Egypt, and use that as an export
vehicle from Egypt to other markets.
Mr. Neugebauer. What is----
Mr. Elkind. If I might just jump in for a second----
Mr. Neugebauer. Absolutely.
Mr. Elkind [continuing]. I mean, to your question about
domestic consumption versus export, part of the calculus for
all of the potential domestic consumers has to be whether there
is reliable supply available. And I think about discussions
that one heard in the United States up until even the early
1990s, where a standard reaction was, well, why would you use
natural gas in power plants? Today, the answer is simple:
Because it is very affordable. It is a clean, cheap,
inexpensive, and plentiful fuel.
Now, we have worked with the Israelis on natural gas
utilization issues that are of interest to them, such as
natural gas vehicles, which can help to alleviate the
transportation fuels challenges. They also, as Israel has, have
some particular challenges in this space, where security
concerns which would not be front of mind, necessarily, for a
natural-gas-powered bus in a city in the United States is
absolutely front of mind to our colleagues in Israel. And so we
have worked through some of those issues with some of the very
deep expertise in the DOE lab system. But then, also,
combination systems. They intend to have a much greater share
of renewables in their total fuel mix. And the pairing of
variable renewables resources and quick-ramping natural gas
generation capacity creates some very interesting opportunities
for Israel as well.
Mr. Neugebauer. The power plants in Israel, are they public
or private plants?
Mr. Hochstein. There has been a liberalization of the
market. So, traditionally, the utility company, the IEC, the
Israel Electricity Company, is government-owned. Recently, they
have opened up the market in stages to allow for private
investment to have their own generation. It is still, though,
overwhelmingly dominant by the IEC, it has sort of a
controlling board, the PUA, which controls the policy and the
price setting. So the overwhelming negotiator with Noble and
its Israeli partners, and Delek, was the PUA, because whatever
is established there will essentially set the stage for the
private developers.
The private developers are now trying to take advantage of
gas, but they are also trying to take advantage of renewable
energy and other things. But it is in the early stages of the
privatization and liberalization.
Mr. Neugebauer. Well, that will certainly provide
additional capital, if they will, you know, open up those
opportunities.
Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Dr. Yoho?
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I find this fascinating. You know, I was really excited
when they found those gas supplies in the Mediterranean. And
then my concerns kind of go along with my colleagues Mr. Weber
and Mr. Perlmutter. With the geopolitical landscape, this is a
game changer, obviously. You know, you have this tremendous
supply of natural gas that is there. And, you know, down the
road, they might find petroleum, you know, oil there.
And when you look at the Russian market and what happened
with the Ukraine as they were looking to go into the EU and
Russia put the screws on them and tightened down and said,
well, we are going to hold up your gas, and they threatened
them, how is this going to affect the Russian market? When you
see the price of the natural gas and the hit they have taken
economically--and I know we have talked a little bit about
that--but how do you see Russia coming into this? And what kind
of influence are they going to have on the Baltic states there
and those other ones and teaming up with Iran and putting more
pressure on that area not to develop this?
Mr. Hochstein. I think they are following it very closely.
I think they are very concerned about the change in the market
because of the history of the cold war, the pipelines that go
through Ukraine and primarily the Ukraine route delivers gas to
a significant amount of countries that have the Russian gas as
100 percent of their supplies. And, in some cases, it is less
than 100 percent but the other sources are Russian gas that is
coming through a different venue, so----
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Hochstein [continuing]. It adds up.
The concern there is that they want to keep this leverage,
this political leverage. It is not just about selling gas to
Bulgaria or to Serbia or Croatia or Hungary, et cetera. It is
about keeping the political leverage that is very strong.
And every 4 to 5 years, we have seen the utilization of
that leverage--meaning, in 2005, they shut off the gas to
Ukraine; in 2006, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee created my position as a result; in 2009, they shut
off the gas first to Ukraine, then to the rest of Europe that
gets its gas through Ukraine; in 2014, they shut off the gas in
June to Ukraine yet again.
But we have adapted. And the European Union passed certain
legislation that makes it more difficult for them. So, in June
2014, unlike in the past, we were able to reverse-flow gas from
Poland, from Hungary, and from Slovakia back into Ukraine.
But what we need, the problem to solve this, it will only
be solved if there is new infrastructure at critical nodes in
Eastern and Central Europe that will create a capability to
import gas. Right now, there is none. All the LNG capability is
in Western Europe or, for instance, in Spain and Portugal, but
France doesn't allow any natural gas to flow into France from
Spain and Portugal, so it is essentially stranded.
So we have worked with Greece and Bulgaria about creating
the IGB, the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria, to see if we can
help accelerate and develop an LNG terminal in the waters in
Alexandropoulos in Greece to be able to feed into that, to
ensure that the gas pipeline from Azerbaijan through Turkey
into Greece could also go into Bulgaria, to do the same in
Croatia and Krk island.
The Eastern Mediterranean, if it is developed, if we are
successful in what we are trying to do and the Eastern
Mediterranean develops, it won't only be American gas or
Australian gas or whomever. It will also be a very close, from
a transportation cost perspective, for Egyptian LNG to reach in
or for Turkey to carry that gas because it already has the
interconnecting infrastructure. So you don't have to pay for
any new infrastructure.
So this can really not only create new geopolitical
relationships in the region--and I mean both geological and
geographic--but it will also create an ability for Europe to
use that gas to begin to free itself from the dependency on
Russian gas and political----
Mr. Yoho. And that is what I want because that leads into,
I think, the more serious thing, because as Russia gets
squeezed more, we know they are going to react in some way,
more than likely.
What would you recommend on a U.S. foreign policy,
something we can do to help--I don't want to say stabilize that
area--but secure that area with our ally like Israel? You know,
I mean, more bases, more military equipment, or just a presence
in that area without overstepping our boundary, but just to let
them know we are here to help protect our allies.
Mr. Hochstein. Well, two things. One, I think they already
would like us to continue the role that we are playing
diplomatically in creating the connections so that they can
have an export market into the global market and especially
into Europe. That is something that they have asked for
continued support, and we will continue to do that.
The second, though--and this is not only the
administration, but Congress as well--is to continue to stand
steadfast against the Russian projects. The way they will
undermine these kinds of developments is by building projects
where they will dump a lot of money--that a normal economic
project wouldn't allow--to build new infrastructure that
connects Russia to Europe, that solidifies the monopoly status
for the next generation or two, and would lock out Israeli gas,
American gas, others----
Dr. Yoho. Sure.
Mr. Hochstein [continuing]. And force them into costlier
markets further out.
So we need to continue this work beyond this administration
and to work with our allies in Western and Eastern Europe to be
able to block those kinds of political projects that the
Russians are promoting in Eastern and Central Europe.
Mr. Yoho. All right. I appreciate it. I am out of time.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Yoho.
And I would like to recognize for our last question-and-
answer period Mr. Bilirakis.
But I want to point out that we have--we are so honored to
have the Cypriot Ambassador here with us.
So thank you, sir. Sorry that I did not call you out first.
Mr. Bilirakis?
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it so
much.
A question for Mr. Hochstein: The U.S. administration in a
number of previous instances has upheld the right of the
Republic of Cyprus to exercise its sovereign rights in its
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
And I have asked this question when I was a member of the
Foreign Affairs Committee a few years ago, and I received
confirmation at that time from the State Department. Could you
reconfirm the above position and inform us, in what practical
ways can the administration support the effective exercise of
that right?
Mr. Hochstein. I don't know what has been said in the past,
so I will just speak to what is our policy today. And I think
we have stated it clearly, and I will try to be as clear as I
can.
Mr. Bilirakis. Fair enough.
Mr. Hochstein. We strongly support the Republic of Cyprus'
rights to develop natural resources in its offshore. I think I
have said that publicly, both when I was in Cyprus and in
travels around the region. We have continuously, when there has
been any obstacle to them, we have worked to clear that and to
make sure that everybody understands the U.S. position.
We support American companies and international companies
in working in all the blocks that have been tendered thus far.
We supported the third energy--the third bid round that was
announced just a few weeks ago so successfully. But--not
``but''--and we also believe that a political solution on the
island will enhance the modernization of those discoveries.
So I can tell you that I, personally, am a frequent and
public cheerleader for discoveries in the offshore in Cyprus. I
speak weekly with Minister Lakkotrypis and other ministers in
Cyprus on seeing how we can be in a position to support Cyprus.
I hope that that answers you as clearly as one can answer that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.
Next question, again for you, Mr. Hochstein: If a
settlement cannot be reached to unify Cyprus, is the option of
shipping Cypriot and Israeli gas to Egypt and perhaps utilizing
the LNG terminals for export elsewhere the most likely phase
one in the Eastern Mediterranean, in your opinion?
Mr. Hochstein. Absent other developments that could happen
between now and then, I think that is the most likely of
scenarios for phase one.
But, as we just discussed, Cyprus just had a new bid round.
ExxonMobil is one of the companies, together with Qatargas,
that has bid. We have to see if new discoveries will be made.
Based on what we know today, with the current volumes that
have been confirmed, the 4\1/2\ to 5 TCF that Noble has
discovered, I would say that is the most likely option. How
exactly we do that, there are a number of different options,
but that is probably the most likely.
If a settlement is reached, then I think it becomes a phase
one of two phases or a concurrent.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
All right. Last question. With the recent coup attempt--and
I know Representative Weber touched on this, but I would like
to touch this question again--with the recent coup attempt in
Turkey, how has this changed the dynamics of the region and the
ongoing Cyprus reunification negotiations?
Mr. Hochstein. Again, as I have said before, I think I will
leave the questions about the political implications to others.
On the energy front, I have not seen a change. I think we
continue to work together with Turkey on energy in an
uninterrupted way. And I hope that the developments in the
region on energy will continue to contribute as a motivator and
accelerator to provide an incentive for the different parties,
including Turkey, to reach a just and lasting agreement in
Cyprus.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Elkind, do you want to touch on that?
Mr. Elkind. Congressman, thank you, but I don't really have
anything to add, other than what I have said previously about
kind of the long view of our engagements with Turkey on energy
issues.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right. Thank you.
I yield back. Appreciate it.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Bilirakis.
And we have 4 minutes to get to a series of votes. So we
thank our witnesses. Thank you to all the members, and thank
you to the audience as well.
And, with that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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[all]Source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg21461/html/CHRG-114hhrg21461.htm
