Loyal Only to Itself: How Turkey Plays the West and Eurasia Simultaneously

An objective assessment of Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy requires stripping away both Western normative frustration and Eurasianist ideological wishful thinking. Ankara operates neither as a rogue NATO satellite bound to return to the liberal internationalist fold, nor as an anti-Western vanguard committed to building a post-Western Eurasian order.

Edited by iEpikaira

Instead, Turkey represents a prototypical Sovereign Swing State—a middle power leveraging its geographical position, military capacity, and diplomatic agility to maximize autonomy in a fragmenting multipolar system. Both Western and Eurasian analytical traditions perceive crucial dimensions of this reality, but both suffer from structural blind spots generated by their respective strategic imperatives.

Critically, neither tradition is monolithic. Each contains a tension between structural-realist analysts, who interpret Turkey’s behavior as rational balancing within a shifting system, and operational or ideological institutions, which frame Turkey through the lens of alliance loyalty, normative compliance, or multipolar solidarity. The realists in both camps see Ankara clearly; the institutional actors in both camps distort it. 

Comparative Framework: Eurasian Realism vs. Western Functional Realism

The analytical divergence between Russian foreign policy thinkers (such as Dmitry Trenin and Sergey Karaganov) and Western strategic analysts (such as John Mearsheimer, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and the Congressional Research Service) stems from fundamentally different reference points. Eurasianists evaluate Turkey through the lens of structural multipolarity and anti-hegemonic realignment, whereas Western analysts evaluate Turkey through the lens of alliance cohesion, institutional compliance, and collective security management.

However, each camp must be disaggregated into two distinct registers before any comparison can proceed:

• The Eurasian camp contains both pragmatic compartmentalizers—analysts like Trenin who accept Turkey as an autonomous regional pole—and ideological advocates of “Greater Eurasia,” including Karaganov’s more ambitious formulations, Russian state media, and multipolar-solidarity rhetoricians who project onto Ankara a civilizational alignment it does not possess.
• The Western camp contains both structural realists—analysts like Mearsheimer who interpret Turkish hedging as predictable middle-power balancing—and liberal institutionalists, NATO bureaucrats, and alliance-management officials who still frame Turkish divergence as a correctable deviation from normative expectations.

This distinction is not cosmetic. It determines which arguments deserve serious engagement and which reflect institutional wishful thinking.

Analytical Dimension	Non-Western / Eurasianist View (Trenin, Karaganov)	Western Analytical View (Mearsheimer, MWI, CRS, FPRI)	Objective Empirical Reality
Primary Framework	Structural Realism & “Greater Eurasia” Multipolarity	Alliance Hedging, Offensive Realism & Liberal Institutionalism	Strategic Autonomy / Transactional Realism
View of Turkey’s Goal	Sovereign pole in a post-Western “Global Majority” world	Transactional NATO ally maximizing leverage via hedging	Multi-vector self-preservation and regional power projection
NATO Membership	Formal legacy constraint diluted by strategic divergence	Indispensable asset constrained by internal misalignment	Dual leverage mechanism against both NATO and Russia
Russian-Turkish Relationship	Pragmatic compartmentalization & multipolar alignment	Opportunistic tactical alliance driven by mutual friction with West	Competitive interdependence with structural collision points
Caucasus & Black Sea	Post-imperial power distribution requiring co-management	Choke-point management and regional counterweight to Russia	Assertive Turkish unilateralism bound by Montreux limits
Primary Vulnerability	Overextension and potential leverage by Western financial systems	Strategic unpredictability, democratic backsliding, S-400 friction	Structural economic frailty and dual dependency on West/East

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Detailed Analytical Comparison

Eurasianist Perspective

(Trenin, Karaganov, Lukyanov)

• Pillar of “Greater Eurasia”
• Anti-hegemonic “Swing State”
• Compartmentalized competitor
• Sovereign manager of Caucasus

Western Perspective

(Mearsheimer, MWI, FPRI, CRS)

• Indispensable but frustrating ally
• Strategic Hedger / Opportunist
• Security provider vs. normative friction point
• Alliance management challenge

The Objective Reality

• Neo-Westphalian autonomy prioritizing sovereign freedom of action
• Dual Leverage: Uses NATO security umbrella to balance Moscow, and Eurasian trade/energy ties to resist Western coercion
• Structural Interdependence: Cannot fully detach from either bloc

1. The Russian / Eurasianist Analytical School

Russian foreign policy analysts view Turkey primarily through the collapse of Western unipolarity. But within this broad orientation, two distinct interpretive layers operate—one realist, the other ideological—and conflating them produces the analytical errors addressed later in this essay.

The Pragmatic Layer: Post-Imperial Realists

• Pragmatic Acceptance of Post-Imperial Parity: Dmitry Trenin’s analysis accurately captures the structural shift in regions like the South Caucasus. Following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Moscow was forced to abandon its long-held assumption of exclusivity in the post-Soviet space. Trenin recognizes that Turkey’s military support for Azerbaijan established Ankara as a permanent co-arbiter of Caucasian security. Rather than treating this as an existential threat, Russian Eurasianists of this school view it as an inevitable outcome of a multipolar order where regional powers assert local hegemony.
• Systemic Compartmentalization: Trenin and like-minded analysts highlight Ankara’s ability to separate distinct geopolitical theaters. Russia and Turkey can back opposing military forces in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus while simultaneously collaborating on major strategic projects like the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, the TurkStream gas pipeline, and the S-400 defense system purchase. Analysts in this school view this compartmentalization not as Turkish disloyalty but as the natural grammar of post-Western diplomacy among sovereign poles.

The Ideological Layer: “Greater Eurasia” Advocates

• Turkey as a Multipolar “Swing State”: In the 2023 Global Majority framework co-authored by Karaganov and Trenin, Turkey is categorized as a vital non-Western pole. Russian strategists in this more ideological register observe Ankara’s refusal to join Western sanctions, its expanded trade with Moscow, and its active role in alternative platforms (BRICS, SCO, Organization of Turkic States) as proof that Western efforts to isolate Russia have failed. To Karaganov, Turkey’s resistance to Western pressure validates the broader thesis of “Greater Eurasia.”
• The Projection Problem: It is here—in the advocacy layer rather than the analytical layer—that Russian thinking begins to overreach. State media, multipolar-solidarity commentators, and portions of the foreign-policy establishment extrapolate from Turkey’s tactical refusals to join Western sanctions a deeper civilizational convergence that Ankara itself has never articulated. This projection is not shared by the more sober compartmentalizers, but it dominates public Russian discourse and shapes policy expectations in Moscow.

Key distinction: Trenin the analyst accepts Turkey as it is—an autonomous regional power pursuing its own interests. Karaganov the advocate, and the broader “Greater Eurasia” milieu surrounding him, describes Turkey as Moscow wishes it to be—a structural pillar of a post-Western order. The later critique of Eurasianist miscalculation is aimed at this second register, not the first.

2. The Western Analytical School

Western strategists evaluate Turkey through the lens of alliance management, collective defense, and structural systemic tensions. Like the Eurasianist camp, however, the Western camp contains two distinct registers—a structural-realist one that reads Turkey accurately, and an institutional-normative one that persistently misreads it.

The Realist Layer: Structural Balancing and Hedging

• Offensive Realism and Middle-Power Hedging: Analysts drawing on John Mearsheimer’s framework interpret Turkey’s posture not as an ideological realignment toward Eurasia, but as classic structural balancing. In a system shifting from unipolarity to multipolarity, middle powers naturally seek strategic autonomy to avoid entrapment by any single superpower. Mearsheimer’s logic suggests that as American hegemony recedes, Turkey’s structural incentive to act independently increases, making alliance cohesion increasingly difficult to maintain through traditional command structures.
• Transactional Bilateralism over Normative Alignment: Reports from Western think tanks (FPRI, Atlantic Council) acknowledge that the era of values-based integration between Turkey and the West (such as EU accession) is effectively over. The relationship has devolved into transactional bargaining over concrete security metrics: counter-terrorism cooperation, migration management, drone transfers to Ukraine, and energy transit routes. Analysts in this register do not expect Turkey to “return” to liberal-internationalist conformity, because they never expected that conformity to be structurally durable in the first place.

The Institutional Layer: Alliance Management and Normative Expectation

• The NATO Paradox: As highlighted by the Modern War Institute and the Congressional Research Service, Western institutions view Turkey through a dual framework. On one hand, Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military, controls the vital Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention, hosts key strategic installations (Incirlik Air Base, Kürecik radar station), and projects power across the Black Sea and Middle East. On the other hand, its acquisition of Russian S-400 air defense systems, vetoes over NATO expansion (e.g., initial holds on Sweden and Finland), and maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean generate deep structural friction within the alliance.
• The Compliance Lens: Where the realist layer sees Turkish hedging as structurally inevitable, the institutional layer—NATO secretariat officials, EU accession bureaucracies, liberal-internationalist commentators—tends to see it as a policy deviation to be corrected through conditionality, normative pressure, or the hope of domestic political change. It is this register, not the realist one, that continues to frame Turkish behavior as the product of a single leader’s personal politics rather than as the expression of a concrete national security consensus.

Key distinction: Mearsheimer-style realists predict Turkish autonomy as a structural inevitability; NATO institutionalists and liberal commentators treat it as a temporary aberration to be reversed. The later critique of Western miscalculation—the “Erdoğan Aberration Fallacy,” normative lecturing, and expectations of subordinate reintegration—targets this institutional register specifically, not the realist analysts who share much of the objective diagnosis offered in this essay.

Evaluating the “Truth”: Where Each Perspective Miscalculates

To locate the objective truth regarding Turkey’s geopolitical position, we must identify the analytical miscalculations inherent in both Western and Eurasianist perspectives.

Where Eurasianists Miscalculate

• Overestimate anti-Western intent
• Ignore NATO security baseline
• Underestimate ideological friction in Turkic / Pan-Turanian arenas
• Misinterpret tactical hedging as structural realignment

Where Westerners Miscalculate

• Treat autonomy as a temporary political aberration
• Rely on normative lecturing
• Expect return to sub-alliance subordination
• Ignore Turkish security threats and grievances

1. Where the Eurasianist Perspective Fails

Russian analysts frequently mistake tactical anti-Western friction for long-term structural alignment with Moscow.

• Overestimating Alignment: Karaganov’s thesis that Turkey serves as a structural pillar of “Greater Eurasia” ignores Ankara’s core grand strategy. Turkey does not seek to replace Western hegemony with a Sino-Russian or Eurasian hegemony; it seeks a system where no single power or bloc can constrain Turkish action.
• The NATO Security Anchor: Moscow underestimates how much Ankara relies on Article 5 of the NATO treaty as a structural safety net. Turkey’s willingness to engage in high-risk power projection against Russia (e.g., shooting down a Russian Su-24 in 2015, supplying Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine, blocking Russian naval transit through the Straits) is made possible precisely because Turkey operates under the NATO security umbrella. Without NATO membership, Turkey would face Russian power from a position of relative vulnerability.
• Sub-Imperial Collision Vectors: Russian thinkers often downplay the long-term threat posed by Turkish expansionism to core Russian interests. Ankara’s active promotion of the Organization of Turkic States directly targets Central Asia and Russia’s Turkic-populated regions. Furthermore, Turkey’s push for the Zangezur Corridor through Armenia threatens Moscow’s strategic position in the South Caucasus.

2. Where the Western Perspective Fails

Western analysts frequently mistake structural geopolitical shifts for temporary domestic politics.

• The “Erdoğan Aberration” Fallacy: Western policy institutions often assume that Turkey’s strategic divergence is purely a product of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s personal politics and democratic backsliding. This is a major miscalculation. The drive for strategic autonomy, defense-industrial self-reliance, and an independent regional posture is shared across the entire Turkish political and national security spectrum (including secular nationalists and opposition coalitions).
• Failure to Understand Turkish Security Perceptions: Western analyses frequently fail to account for the depth of Turkish grievances regarding Western policies. Washington’s arming of the YPG/PKK, the perceived Western sheltering of dissidents involved in the 2016 coup attempt, and sanctions targeting Turkey’s defense sector (CAATSA) are viewed in Ankara as direct threats to Turkish sovereignty.
• The Illusion of Containment or Exclusion: Western discussions regarding “disciplining” or “excluding” Turkey from Western security structures fail to recognize the operational reality. In such case Turkey would push Ankara into deeper security and economic integration with Beijing and Moscow. So containing it should be carefully choreographed in order to keep Russia and China away from finding common grounds with Turkey.

The Objective Reality: Turkey’s Strategic Position in Global Geopolitics

Turkey operates under a grand strategy of Neo-Westphalian Maximization. By stripping away the common rhetorical layers of "Neo-Ottomanism" or "Islamism," Turkey’s actions reveal a strong nationalist and ultra-nationalist stance of a state calculating how to maximize its power in a shifting multipolar world. Its geopolitical posture can be synthesized into four core operational pillars:

-Independent Defense-Industrial Capability

-Compartmentalized Diplomacy (War & Business)

-Hard Balancing via Hedging (West & East)

-Geographic Chokepoint Leverage

1. Hard Balancing Through Dual Interdependence

Turkey avoids total strategic commitment to either Western or Eurasian blocs. Instead, it uses its relationship with each to maintain leverage over the other:

• It uses Russian energy, financial flows, and regional coordination (in Syria and the Caucasus) to push back against Western political pressure and sanctions.
• It uses Western military integration, market access, and NATO deterrence to prevent Russian hegemony in the Black Sea and Middle East.

2. Defense-Industrial Sovereignty as Strategic Foundation

Ankara has recognized that foreign policy autonomy is impossible without domestic military-industrial capability. By increasing its domestic defense production capacity from under 20% in the early 2000s to over 80% today—developing advanced uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), naval assets (TCG Anadolu), electronic warfare systems, and its own fifth-generation fighter program (KAAN)—Turkey has dramatically reduced its vulnerability to Western arms embargoes and Russian coercive leverage.

3. Strict Choke-Point Governance

Turkey treats its control over key geographic access points as non-negotiable instruments of national power:

• The Montreux Convention: By strictly enforcing the Montreux Convention during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ankara successfully prevented NATO from over-militarizing the Black Sea while simultaneously stopping Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet. This preserved Turkey’s position as  regional balancer.
• Cross-Border Security Buffer Zones: In Syria and Iraq, Turkey maintains unilateral military footprints operating independently of US and Russia.

4. Pragmatic Commercial Multi-Alignment

Turkey positions itself as a major logistics, energy, and financial hub connecting East and West:

• It functions simultaneously as a primary energy corridor for European supply (TurkStream, Southern Gas Corridor) and a crucial economic conduit for Russian capital, trade, and aviation facing Western sanctions.
• It leverages its geographic position to secure Western trade capital via its EU Customs Union membership while actively soliciting Gulf funds, Chinese infrastructure investment, and Eurasian trade connections.

Strategic Action Plan: How External Powers Should Manage Turkey

Any realistic strategy toward Turkey must begin with a sober recognition: Ankara has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to extract benefits from both Western and Eurasian power centers while avoiding deep commitments to either. Turkey’s diplomacy is not merely “multi-vector” or “balanced”; it is often deliberately ambiguous, transactional, and opportunistic. It seeks NATO protection, Western markets, and European financial access while simultaneously cultivating Russian energy dependence, sanctions-evasion channels, Eurasian political platforms, and non-Western defense ties.

This creates a clear credibility problem. Turkey presents itself to NATO as indispensable while undermining alliance cohesion; it presents itself to Russia and Eurasian actors as a sovereign alternative to Western pressure while still relying on NATO deterrence when confronting Moscow. In practice, Ankara uses each side as leverage against the other and converts geopolitical tension into bargaining power.

1. Negative Turkish Actions Toward the West and NATO

Turkey’s relationship with the West is not simply strained by misunderstandings or cultural differences. It has been damaged by turkish actions that have weakened trust, undermined NATO planning, and raised doubts about Ankara’s reliability in a major crisis.

• Weaponizing NATO consensus rules: Turkey has repeatedly used NATO’s consensus-based decision-making to extract concessions from allies. Its delays over Finland and Sweden’s accession demonstrated that Ankara is willing to hold alliance-wide strategic priorities hostage to its own bilateral demands.
• Purchasing the Russian S-400 system: Ankara’s acquisition of the S-400 air defense system from Russia directly undermined NATO interoperability and created security risks regarding sensitive Western defense technology. This was not a symbolic disagreement; it was a major breach of alliance trust.
• Undermining Western sanctions policy: Turkey refused to join Western sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. It increased trade with Moscow and became an important commercial and financial outlet for Russia at a time when NATO allies were trying to isolate Moscow economically.
• Using migration as political leverage: Ankara has repeatedly used the threat of opening migration routes toward Europe as a bargaining tool. This has turned a humanitarian and border-security issue into an instrument of coercive diplomacy against the European Union.
• Challenging fellow NATO and Western-aligned states: Turkey’s maritime disputes with Greece and Cyprus, military posturing in the Eastern Mediterranean, and aggressive claims over energy zones have created intra-alliance instability and diverted NATO attention away from collective threats.
• Ambiguous commitment to collective defense: Although Turkey is formally bound by NATO’s Article 5, its recent behavior raises legitimate doubts about how it would act in a crisis involving Russia or another major power. Article 5 does not automatically require identical military action from every member; each ally determines the measures it considers necessary. This gives Ankara room for delay, bargaining, or minimal -if any- compliance.
• Transactional rather than loyal alliance behavior: Turkey often treats NATO membership less as a shared strategic commitment and more as a bargaining asset. It benefits from the alliance’s deterrence umbrella while frequently resisting alliance discipline, policy coordination, and strategic alignment.

2. Negative Turkish Actions Toward Russia and Eurasian Powers

Turkey’s behavior toward Russia and Eurasian actors is equally opportunistic. Ankara presents itself as a pragmatic partner of Moscow when it benefits economically, but it also actively undermines Russian interests in multiple theaters. Turkey is not a reliable Eurasian ally; it is a competitor that uses cooperation with Russia as leverage against the West while simultaneously containing Russian influence where Turkish interests require it.

• Supporting Ukraine militarily: Turkey has supplied Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 drones and other defense cooperation despite maintaining extensive economic relations with Russia. This allows Ankara to profit from ties with Moscow while strengthening one of Russia’s primary military adversaries.
• Blocking Russian naval reinforcement: By enforcing the Montreux Convention after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey restricted Russian naval movement through the Turkish Straits. While legally defensible, this action limited Moscow’s ability to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet.
• Expanding influence in the South Caucasus: Turkey’s military and political support for Azerbaijan helped weaken Russia’s traditional dominance in the South Caucasus. Ankara has used Azerbaijan as a strategic gateway to project power into a region Moscow long considered part of its privileged sphere of influence.
• Promoting Turkic integration: Through the Organization of Turkic States and broader Pan-Turkic diplomacy, Ankara cultivates influence across Central Asia and among Turkic populations historically connected to Russian imperial and Soviet space. This creates long-term strategic anxiety for Moscow.
• Competing with Russia in Syria and Libya: Turkey has backed forces opposed to Russian-supported actors in Syria and Libya. Even while negotiating with Moscow, Ankara has repeatedly used military power to challenge Russian objectives on the ground.
• Using economic cooperation as leverage: Turkey benefits from Russian tourism, energy, nuclear investment, and trade flows, but it does not convert this economic relationship into strategic loyalty. Instead, Ankara uses economic interdependence to extract benefits while preserving freedom to oppose Moscow elsewhere.
• Refusing a true Eurasian alignment: Turkey participates in Eurasian platforms and gestures toward BRICS, the SCO, and the “Global Majority,” but it has not abandoned NATO, the EU Customs Union, or Western financial structures. Moscow’s mistake is to interpret Turkish anti-Western rhetoric as proof of strategic alignment.

3. Turkey’s Core Method: Playing Both Sides Without Full Commitment

Turkey’s strategic behavior is best understood as a deliberate policy of dual extraction. Ankara seeks to gain security, money, weapons, markets, diplomatic relevance, and regional influence from all sides while avoiding obligations. It wants the benefits of NATO without the discipline of NATO, the benefits of Russia without subordination to Moscow, and the benefits of Eurasian multipolarity without abandoning Western economic and weapons access.

• From the West, Turkey seeks: NATO deterrence, access to advanced defense systems, European markets, investment, intelligence cooperation, and diplomatic legitimacy.
• From Russia and Eurasia, Turkey seeks: cheap energy, tourism revenue, nuclear infrastructure, sanctions-related trade opportunities, tactical coordination in Syria and the Caucasus, and bargaining leverage against Washington and Brussels.
• What Turkey avoids giving: loyalty, predictable alignment, full sanctions enforcement, permanent alliance discipline, or strategic subordination to any bloc.

This strategy has been effective for Ankara up until now, but it generates distrust everywhere. Western states increasingly question whether Turkey is a dependable ally. The Kremlin also quietly recognizes that Turkey is not a honest Eurasian partner. Smaller regional states see Turkey as a power willing to exploit instability for influence. The result is that Turkey gains tactical advantages, but at the cost of long-term strategic credibility.

4. Recommendations for the West

Western policy should stop assuming that Turkey will eventually “return” to loyal alliance behavior. Ankara’s strategic autonomy is not temporary, and its use of NATO as leverage is now a structural pattern. The West should therefore adopt a more conditional, hard-edged, interest-based approach.

• End unconditional strategic tolerance: NATO should not treat Turkey as automatically trustworthy simply because it is geographically important. Access, intelligence sharing, and defense-industrial cooperation should be tied to measurable behavior.
• Limit sensitive technology transfers: Until Ankara resolves the S-400 issue and demonstrates reliable alliance behavior, Western states should remain cautious about providing advanced systems that could be compromised by non-western defense links.
• Reduce dependence on Turkish chokepoints where possible: NATO and the EU should develop alternative infrastructure, basing options, energy routes, and regional partnerships to prevent Ankara from monopolizing leverage over the southern flank.
• Respond firmly to coercive bargaining: Migration pressure, NATO veto threats, and military brinkmanship against Greece or Cyprus should not be rewarded automatically. Concessions given under pressure only encourage further Turkish escalation.
• Prepare for limited Article 5 reliability: Western planners should privately account for the real possibility that Turkey may delay, dilute, or condition its support in a NATO crisis. This does not mean expelling Turkey, but it does mean planning around uncertainty during critical times.

5. Recommendations for Russia and Eurasian Powers

Russia and Eurasian actors should also abandon remaining illusions about Turkey. Ankara’s disagreements with the West do not make it a reliable partner of Moscow. Turkey is a regional competitor that will cooperate with Russia when profitable and oppose it when advantageous.

• Do not mistake anti-Western rhetoric for alignment: Turkish criticism of the West is often a bargaining tactic, not a commitment to Eurasian solidarity.
• Limit strategic dependency on Turkey: Russia should avoid allowing Turkey to become an indispensable transit, financial, or energy hub that can later be used against Moscow.
• Set firm boundaries in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Turkish expansion through Azerbaijan, the Organization of Turkic States, and military cooperation with post-Soviet states should be treated as a long-term strategic challenge.
• Preserve cooperation, but assume competition: Energy projects, tourism, and trade can continue, but Russian planning should assume that Turkey will support anti-Russian actors whenever it serves Turkish interests.
• Avoid over-reliance on personal diplomacy: Turkish-Russian relations often depend heavily on leader-to-leader bargaining. This is unstable and can collapse quickly during military crises, as seen after the 2015 Su-24 incident.

The central lesson for both East and West is the same: Turkey should be engaged, but not trusted. Ankara respects leverage, costs, and reciprocal advantage far more than alliance sentiment or ideological solidarity. Any external power that grants Turkey benefits without enforceable obligations will likely see Ankara pocket the gains and continue bargaining with the other side.

Analytical Synthesis

Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy is best understood as a disciplined strategy of opportunistic sovereignty. It is not loyal to the West, but it is not loyal to Eurasia either. It is loyal primarily to its own freedom of maneuver. Ankara has learned to profit from systemic rivalry by presenting itself as indispensable to every side while remaining fully committed to none.

To the West, Turkey sells geography, military capacity, migration control, Black Sea access, and NATO relevance. Yet it simultaneously undermines Western sanctions, purchases Russian military systems, obstructs NATO consensus, pressures European states through migration, and challenges fellow NATO-linked actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. This creates a fundamental contradiction: Turkey wants the privileges of alliance membership without consistently accepting the obligations of alliance solidarity.

To Russia and Eurasia, Turkey sells commercial access, energy cooperation, sanctions-resistant trade channels, and anti-Western rhetoric. Yet it simultaneously arms Ukraine, blocks Russian naval options through the Straits, expands Turkic influence into the post-Soviet space, supports Azerbaijan against Russian-backed Armenian positions, and competes with Moscow in Syria and Libya. This creates an equivalent contradiction: Turkey wants the economic benefits of partnership with Russia without accepting any durable Eurasian discipline.

The deepest problem is credibility. Turkey’s strategy of playing both sides has produced short-term gains, but it has also made Ankara appear unreliable to almost everyone. Western capitals cannot be certain Turkey would fully support NATO in a major Article 5 crisis, especially if Ankara believed neutrality, delay, or bargaining would better serve its interests. Moscow cannot be certain Turkey would remain neutral in a Russian confrontation with the West, especially when Ankara has already shown a willingness to arm Russia’s adversaries while maintaining business with Russia.

This does not mean Turkey is irrational. On the contrary, Ankara’s behavior is often highly rational from a narrow national-interest perspective. It extracts resources, concessions, diplomatic attention, and strategic relevance from a divided international system. But rationality should not be confused with reliability. Turkey is predictable only in one respect: it will pursue Turkish advantage first, even if that requires contradicting yesterday’s commitments or exploiting today’s partners.

Therefore, both Western and Eurasian analysts must abandon comforting illusions. Turkey is not a temporarily wayward NATO ally waiting to be reintegrated into liberal order. Nor is it a committed pillar of a post-Western Eurasian bloc. It is a hard-nosed swing state that uses NATO against Russia, Russia against NATO, Europe against the Middle East, and regional instability against all external patrons.

Turkey should receive some benefits only when it provides concrete, verifiable, and reciprocal value. It should face major costs when it undermines partners, exploits crises, or weaponizes institutional access. Engagement with Ankara must be built on caution rather than trust.

In conclusion, Turkey’s strength is its ability to stand between rival blocs. Its weakness is that, by exploiting all sides, it risks being trusted by none.