ΕΠΙΚΑΙΡΟΣ 
Η γένεση της τουρκικής υψηλής στρατηγικής στο Κυπριακό
Εισαγωγή – επιµέλεια Χρήστος Ιακώβου 2017
Η μετάφραση των Εκθέσεων του Δρ. Νιχάτ Ερίμ, μεταφρασμένες από τον κ. Χρήστο Ιακώβου, με Εισαγωγή και επιμέλεια από τον ίδιο (Χρήστο Ιακώβου) δημοσιεύθηκαν στο βιβλίο του κ. Κώστα Ν. Χατζηκωστή, «Έξι Προεδρικά Πορτραίτα» έκδοση «Γερμανός» Θεσσαλονικη - πρώτη έκδοση 2015. Αναρτημένες στους πιο κάτω δύο συνδέσμους. Πιο κάτω η μετάφραση στα αγγλικά από τα ελληνικά από Φανούλα Αργυρού 19.10.2022
https://i-epikaira.blogspot.com/2023/02/blog-post_32.html
https://forum.agora-dialogue.com/2023/02/07/%CE%BF%CE%B9-%CE%B1%CF%80%CF%8C%CF%81%CF%81%CE%B7%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%82-%CE%B5%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%AD%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82-%CE%BD%CE%B9%CF%87%CE%AC%CF%84-%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%AF%CE%BC/
THE SECRET REPORTS
NIHAT ERIM
The genesis of the Turkish high strategy in the Cyprus issue
Introduction - Edited by Christos Iacovou
2017
Introduction
The member states of the international system have certain strategic objectives, these may be long-term or short-term, coherent or contradictory. In this way, the internal and external environment of a country creates various requirements and is the source of challenges and opportunities for the realization of the goals and aspirations of the state. The strategy of adaptation chosen by a state is the proof of how the national structures of power adapt to the interdependence of the national and international system. In this context, states function as adaptable entities that seek to maintain their basic structures, i.e. their political, economic and social characteristics, within acceptable limits, both in their foreign policy and in their security policy. The above constitutes the digestibility for the formation of what in strategic studies is called Grand Strategy. In other words, the high strategy sets hierarchical goals taking into account the international environment and the desired position of a country in order to mobilize the wider national potential and resources of the state in order to achieve three key goals: a) stability, b) prosperity and c) security. A prerequisite for the implementation of the high strategy is the identification of weaknesses and strengths at national level in order to effectively address the risks and seize the opportunities.
One of the key factors in shaping high strategy is geopolitics, that is, the interpretation and analysis of the interdependence between geographical space and the political choices made by a state in order to utilize and increase its military, economic and diplomatic power. Geopolitical analysis therefore takes into account the existence of international competition in relation to strategic planning in various fields such as military power (geo-strategy), economy (geo-economics), natural environment, demographic trends, etc.
In 1956, during the Greek armed struggle for the Union of Cyprus with Greece and immediately after the Suez Crisis, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Adnan Menderes, decided to appoint as a permanent advisor of the Turkish state Professor of Constitutional Law Nihat Erim and Member of Parliament for The People’s Republican Party. He entrusted him with the drafting of a strategic plan on which to base Turkey's long-term aspirations on the Cyprus issue.
At the end of 1956, Nihat Erim presented two reports (November 24 and December 22) to Prime Minister Menderes. Those Nihat Erim reports formed the basic strategic plan on the basis of which the Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue was implemented. The most important report is the first while the second was submitted as a supplement to the first in order to provide answers to issues mainly related to the submission of the Radcliffe Plan.
Those reports were published and commented upon by Nihat Erim himself for the first time in the first two chapters of the book of his essays on the Cyprus issue entitled "Bildiğim ve gördüğüm ölçüler içinde Kıbrıs", ("Cyprus as I got to know her and saw her” 1975). Some of these reports first appeared in the Greek language with comments, in the second volume of the book by Panteion University professor Neoklis Sarris: "The Other Side: Diplomatic Chronology of the Cyprus Militia Based on Turkish Sources" (Grammi Publications, 1982).
That plan was accepted by all Turkish governments, since it was a state policy, and it was followed with efficiency, coherence, energy and firm commitment to the strategic goals.
The main pillars of the reports were:
Turkish claims on Cyprus should not be based on legal arguments but on political reasons. However, in order not to create a problem to the British-Turkish-Greek relations, if self-government is granted to the island, the best solution is the immediate solution, that is, that of partition.
Turkey should insist internationally that there are two different communities in Cyprus, each of which has the right to separate self-determination. The future of the two separate peoples, whether independence or union with the motherland or the continuation of British rule, must be decided by a separate referendum in each of the two.
The principle of self-determination should be applied after the Greek population first resettles so that it comes under the administration of its choice. Such a move would not be an unjustified inconvenience but would help to prevent the rights of the Turkish community, which is currently in the minority, from being violated, in addition to satisfying Turkey's security and avoiding a future Greek-Turkish crisis.
Turkey should determine the most appropriate for her form of partition, taking into account its economic and military interests as well as the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey must necessarily participate in the security of the region that will be granted to the Romious (Greeks) of the island, because the issue is related to its security as well as its policy in the Middle East. Greece cannot claim the same right for the Turkish region because the island is 45 n.m away from Turkey while 600 n.m from Greece.
The free movement of Turks to Cyprus should be sought. Once Turkey takes action, the total Turkish population may increase to the number of the time of the Ottoman Empire. Only then will Turkey not worry about the outcome of the referendum that will take place either to determine the whole island or its partition.
Ismail Nihat Erim (1912 - 1980) visited Cyprus during the EOKA struggle, took part in various talks related to the Cyprus Question and in 1959 was a member of the Turkish delegation in the negotiations, which began in Zurich and reached the well-known agreements. Between 1959 and 1960 he was the head of the Turkish delegation for the drafting and elaboration of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Erim also served at the United Nations headquarters as head of the Turkish delegation. There he defended the Turkish position vis-à-vis Cyprus.
He became Prime Minister of Turkey after the 1971 coup. He was assassinated by two Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol) communists in Constantinople on July 19, 1980. His assassination was seen as revenge for decisions he took whilst Prime Minister of Turkey under the coup d’etat for communists’ death sentences, which gave the excuse for the military coup on December 12, 1980.
The two reports, drafted in 1956, set out clear short-term, medium-term and long-term strategic goals from which the Turkish foreign policy on the Cyprus issue did not deviate. His policy drafted in 1956 was followed by all Turkish governments of the last 61 years, which did not deviate from the basic principles, as well as the respective military leaders who, whenever called upon, provided solutions without any political interference.
According to Erim’s memoirs, on November 16, 1956, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Adnan Menderes, proposed to the professor the position of the government's special adviser on the Cyprus issue. Although Erim was also a member of parliament for the opposition People's Republican Party, he accepted the proposal because he regarded his decision to be of a national nature.
Erim writes in his memoirs, "Menderes, during our meeting at the Prime Minister's Office, after many compliments towards myself that flattered me, gave me the following directions to work on:
1) To keep Cyprus under the current regime, i.e English colony.
2) If the British are going to leave Cyprus, the island will have to be returned to Turkey.
3) If this is not possible to materialise, we should seek to divide the island.
4) To work out the possibility of self-government (note: rather meant independence).
5) We must definitely prevent the union of Cyprus with Greece.
During our meeting, the Prime Minister said that friendly countries close to Turkey, such as Pakistan, expressed their support and advised us to base our position on strong legal foundations.
After carefully examining the files at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which concerned the Cyprus issue, I came to the conclusion of drafting a report in which I would present to the Prime Minister how I personally perceive the Cyprus issue and point out the need for a strong legal basis in our claims."
The first report by Nihat Erim
“In my report of 24 November 1956, which I submitted to the Government, I highlight the points which I consider to be the most important. Supporting the position of Cyprus remaining under the current regime, i.e British hands, will not find supporters in the United Nations. The trend in international relations in the post-World War II era has been dominated by the view that colonialism should be abolished. In addition, Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations imposes on England the task of securing self-government. After all, from the beginning of the crisis, England quickly changed its attitude and accepted self-determination in the form of self-government. It is not right for Turkey, by claiming geographical, historical and strategic rights over Cyprus, to support the position that the island should remain a British colony. Supporting this first view, Turkey should give the following argument:
The sovereignty of Cyprus should remain with Britain, but it goes without saying that it must recognize the right of self-government to its people.
How and in what form this self-government must have, I will elaborate below, setting out my views on it.
Britain can only grant Cyprus to us.
This view should be supported by the Turkish government from the beginning. The geographical, historical and mainly strategic causes are logical. The importance of the island for the armed forces on land, navy and air force has been proven mainly and actively during the Suez crisis. Turkey's security, the functioning of the Baghdad Agreement (CENTO) and NATO are closely linked to who owns Cyprus.
The legal argument based on the Treaty of Lausanne sounded lacking. Article 20 of the Treaty unreservedly grants sovereignty over Cyprus to Britain. Even if it is not mentioned in Article 16 as Greece did, already with Article 20 Turkey's legal arguments have no base. Against this, one can argue a contradiction which is not easy to reject. In addition, there is another disadvantage in examining the whole matter within the framework of the Treaty of Lausanne: the Treaty cannot be revoked without the consent of the other Contracting Parties. That is, the case is not only in the hands of England, Turkey and Greece. Nevertheless, if Cyprus is given to Greece the position, in which the political and strategic balance established by the Treaty of Lausanne will be completely disrupted at the expense of our country, this position is very strong from a political point of view. In this case, this position is of great importance. By clarifying this from the beginning, our government has acted correctly. In fact, it is very positive that the Honourable Prime Minister told the British Ambassador on 28 June 1956 that since what is requested is the disturbing of what was created by the Treaty of Lausanne, bilateral negotiations will have to take place with Greece to discuss all the issues concerning Greek-Turkish relations (this request is being raised today). This request has subsequently been explained in a clearer manner to the British and Americans: i.e made them aware that the subjects of Western Thrace, the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople and some Aegean islands will have to be raised. This is considered very constructive. These subjects are our best weapon against the Greeks. Because now is the time to become clearer on these issues.
Pointing out above that the Treaty of Lausanne cannot be used from our part as a legal basis for the Cyprus issue in our favour, I do not mean to give up what we have done so far. At the 9th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the British representative developed his views in accordance with the Turkish positions. Indeed, as the head of our delegation notes in a detailed report he sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this view has created a negative influence towards Greece on some Latin American countries.
Because the United Nations is not a tribunal, such manoeuvres can prove to be powerful and useful in their own right. But we must not forget the essence of the matter. The head of our delegation proposed (to seek) the opinion of various other lawyers of our country on Articles 16 and 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne. I asked the relevant officials and no such thing has been requested for the time being.
Such an opinion will certainly be useful in every way and will run ahead of the discussions that will take place in the United Nations General Assembly.
In the moral field, the most effective rebuttal to Turkey's proposal to return Cyprus to Turkey, is Self-Determination, which is a universally accepted principle with doctrinal force. Because today in Cyprus the Greeks are the majority, the obstacle that makes it completely impossible for Cyprus to return to Turkey by the United Nations General Assembly, is Self-Determination. On the other hand because Self-Determination is still not clear as to its definition and application, it does not have the power to abandon the fate of Cyprus to the delight (that is, at the disposal) of the Greeks. It will be described in more detail in paragraph 5 below. In summary:
The return of Cyprus to Turkey is not based on legal causes, but on political ones, i.e it will not create legal, but political results. Turkey must maintain its demands until the end. It must be said that in the event that Cyprus is granted to Turkey, its people will enjoy equal rights, without distinction of religion, race or family origin.
Union of Cyprus with Greece or its return to Turkey? These are the two remote possibilities. If the status quo is not maintained, England will want to close the issue temporarily with self-government. But since the Cyprus issue has been opened, neither on the part of Greece, nor on the part of Turkey, will end with self-government. The relations of the three countries for this reason will be constantly poisoned. Finding a solution and resolving the problem in a half way agreed solution from one hand will be in line with the principles of justice but from the other hand will not constitute under present circumstances, the only politically possible outcome. It is a settlement typical of England's realism and management effort. And this half way solution is the partition of Cyprus.
The idea of partition has been discussed and studied in some secret, formal and informal negotiations between Turkey, Greece, England and America.
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak has proposed his mediation in this regard. According to information from the file study, Greece is considering leaving a narrow corridor to Turkey to the north of the island. In a line drawn from north to south, British Undersecretary of State Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick wanted to divide the island from the east and give the east to Greece and the west to Turkey. The Honourable Prime Minister (Menderes) told him that his idea is to demand a bifurcation. He raised the issue with the American General Helms (Richard McGarrah Helms who later served under President Johnson and Nixon as head of the CIA 1966-1973- born 1913-died 2002) who came here as Dulles’ representative, in extremely cautious language and as if it were likely to happen. The partition of Cyprus, basically, between Greece and Turkey, perhaps even with the concession to England of an area for military bases (note by Chr. Iacovou - which materialised under the Treaty of London), means the application of the principle of self-determination in a fair manner. And here's why:
We can say that the population of Cyprus consists of 481,000 Orthodox Christian Greek-speakers and 100,000 thousand Turkish Muslims. The total of the other elements amounts to 10,000. As a result, there live in Cyprus intermingled two different communities, two different entities. When there is a normal division, each of these two distinct communities will probably prefer the sovereignty of the state which it considers to be its Motherland. That is, both the Greek community and the Turkish community will make free use of their right to self-determination. In this way, it will not necessarily be placed under the sovereignty of a state or a minority, which is a completely separate entity and to which the state owes to it, simply because it is the will of the majority.
At the Lausanne Treaty Venizelos rejected the Turkish proposal
for a referendum in Western Thrace, on the pretext that the region in question is not homogeneous but heterogeneous, i.e its population is mixed. In this respect, Cyprus is similar to Western Thrace. If today the mentality of the United Nations allows it, the implementation of the position supported by Venizelos in Lausanne will lead to the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey without a referendum. But today it seems impossible to impose a solution that is contrary to the principle of self-determination.
Therefore, we must maintain self-determination till the end and safeguard justice. The question will be asked separately in the two communities, and for those who will remain in the Greek region of Cyprus will be:
1. Independence?
2. Union with Greece?
3. Acceptance of the British administration?
4. Do you want anything else?
The Turks of the Turkish region will be asked the same questions, with the modification of the second question. In this way the theoretical principle of self-determination finds its most advanced practical application.
The various problems that will arise from partition again can be resolved with a more liberal and broad spirit. We can say that in the event that such a proposal were submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and provided that it had the direct support of the countries concerned, it could be fully accepted. Otherwise, it will again be possible to resolve the problem by consultation between the States concerned. Greece may not approach direct partition. There are irrefutable allegations against this.
The principle of self-determination will be applied through the gathering of all Greeks in the same area that will ensure their living under the administration of their choice. An exchange of populations is inevitable, which carried out on a small scale and proportionally at close range, will preserve the same environment and the same climatic conditions. It does not constitute an unnecessary inconvenience or movement of a portion of people in order not to violate the right to self-determination of the Turkish community, which today is a minority, in order to secure the possibilities of defending the security of Turkey and to eliminate a brewing crisis, which in the future can cause suffering for the same reason. Mainly, if one takes into account that the proposed relocation of the populations will be done with the current technical means and the existing amenities.
The idea of the partition of Cyprus is supported by the legal and humanitarian principle of self-determination. The political expediency that supports this plan, is the need to place the island's military power in solid and superior hands, in defence of the interests and security of Turkey, the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and NATO.
Taking into account the possibility that our proposal for the partition of Cyprus is accepted, Turkey should henceforth determine through its competent officials, which form of partition will be more suitable for it, taking into account its military, economic and Turkish interests and the interests of the Turkish population in Cyprus. Turkey should also participate in the security of the region that will be granted to the Greeks of Cyprus, because it will be related to the security of Turkey and the Near East. The same right cannot be demanded by Greece, for the Turkish region, because the island is 45 miles from Anatolia, while 600 from Piraeus”.
The report then refers to the draft constitution prepared by Lord Radcliffe, which, as announced on 13 November 1956, had already been submitted to the British Government. Erim comments:
"The constitution has been drafted by Radcliffe to ensure self-government. After all, the interrupted negotiations between Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, General Sir John Harding, revolved around this issue. The British government has openly stated that after a certain period of time it will give the opportunity for self-determination. It may not seem reprehensible that the constitution will not include a provision that would clearly recognise the right of the Turkish community to self-determination. However this must be foreseen by taking the following measures:
a)As our Government repeatedly states from the beginning the first condition for self-government is the cessation of terrorism by the Greeks. No matter what a year of peaceful time must elapse before self-government can be put into force.
b) The fact that no talks are taking place with the participation of the representative of the Turkish community is contrary to Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations.
c) A committee consisting of representatives of Turkey, England and Greece must supervise the implementation of the status of self-government.
d) We must insist that the status of self-determination must include the free repatriation of Turks from abroad to Cyprus - this of course will apply to the Greeks as well. If during the examination of the issue it is found that the granting of this right will increase the Turkish more than the Greek population of Cyprus, we must insist on this.
e) This right is very important for the future referendum for self-determination. During the referendum that will take place after 10 years and provided we behave cautiously, taking the necessary measures, the total number of Turks can increase to the percentage similar to that during the Ottoman rule.
Then we will not worry about the referendum that will be held for the purpose of either determining the fate of the whole island, or partition. For the constitution of self-government, we can benefit from the report prepared by the Institute of International Relations of the School of Political Science ".
Nihat Erim explains Turkey's strategic interests:
“What Turkey will never accept is the opening of the road for the annexation of the island to Greece under the pretext of providing the people of Cyprus with the right to self-determination. The proximity of Cyprus to our homeland is so obvious, both materially and spiritually, that the abandonment of the island to Greece under the pretext of the implementation of self-determination, constitutes disregard, even shock, of the vital need for the security of Turkey which today has 25,000,000 (1956), in the near future it will have 30 – 40,000,000 million population.
In order to prevent something like this, it is advisable to take the following political measures: To suggest to our allies and friends primarily to the Americans the following points:
The abandonment of Cyprus to Greece or a change in the current regime of Megalonisos, without the prior approval and consent of Turkey, will require the necessity of the revision of the Treaty of Lausanne in terms of relations with the Greeks. Because the Anatolian defence will become more difficult, a re-examination will be required of all of our international obligations and a reassessment of our military endurance.
Regarding the clarification of the principles that should govern the future of Cyprus:
a) There is no rule of positive international law that requires the absolute abandonment of the fate of the island to the will of the Greeks, who today constitute the majority. The majority on the island in history and at times belonged sometimes to the Turks, sometimes to the Greeks. For the last 50 to 60 years, because the Greeks were protected and because the Turks were wronged, they felt the need to leave the island in large numbers. If rights are recognized, the Turkish community can expand rapidly, and it must expand.
b) Self-determination is an ideal principle. It has been included in an unambiguous and confusing way among the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (Article I par. II). In the section of the same map which refers to the colonies (art. 73, par. B), self-government is mentioned, but self-determination is not mentioned. For self-government, in fact, the following term has been added: (in English it is referred: Particular circumstances of each territory): the special conditions of each country must be taken into account. In Cyprus on top of the special conditions comes the existence of two different peoples.
The population consists of two different communities. If the Turkish community surrenders to the will of the Greek (Ρωμαϊκής) community, which currently is in the majority, and is placed under the rule of a government it does not want, it is contrary to the special conditions.
After all, the fact that the country (i.e the Territory) is very close to Turkey and is vital for our security constitutes a special condition which no one can overlook, and which must be taken into account in order to enable the application of Article 73.
Because Cyprus is considered a place where only self-government is considered within the provisions of Chapter II of the Charter of the United Nations, if we remain faithful to the text of the Charter, the United Nations General Assembly is not induced to recognize self-determination to the island. If such a thing is sought, then it will be contrary to the said map. Because according to the Charter of the United Nations, self-determination, i.e independence, is reserved for countries under guardianship (Chapter 12, number 76b).
The Charter of the United Nations can be applied exclusively to self-government. In this case, however, the conditions provided for in Article 73 (b) must be calculated. Article 76 cannot be applied in Cyprus. And this because the latter is not under guardianship.
Even more so as both Articles73 and 76 set the following clear term: (Particular circumstances of each territory and its people), (Each territory and its peoples). We must pay close attention to this expression. Articles 73 and 76 of the Charter of the United Nations refer to each country (territory) that is, in the singular, and to its "peoples", which means that it provided for the possibility of more than one “nation” (people) to live in that country and recognized a separate self-government or self-determination for them. If for each country it envisaged only one community, only one people, then it would use the expression (territory and its people) instead of the expression (territory and its peoples). It is well known that every word and every point of a basic text such as the Charter of the United Nations has been defined after very long discussions. The word "peoples" has not been coined by accident. After all, initially while in the wording of Article 76 the word (people) was singular (minutes of the San Franscico Conference (of 1945) vol. 10, page 453), following an American proposal it was changed to plural (peoples) (page 514). Consequently, what can be asked from the General Assembly of the United Nations is self-government and not self-determination. However whatever principle is applied, because the Turkish population of the island (people) is a whole separate unit (entity), the attempt to drag it back behind the Greek majority (Ρωμιούς) is contrary to the article of the Charter of the United Nations.
From the files and documents presented to me, which refer to the discussions and contacts so far, I did not find any indication that the Turkish representatives have studied the United Nations Charter in this regard. It is proposed to your Excellency, that these simple legal observations regarding Articles 73 and 76 should be taken into account by our Representatives at the United Nations Delegation.
The United Nations Commission for Human Rights discussed the item of self-determination. There have been profound differences of opinion between the delegations. It has been said that the application of Articles 73 and 76 necessitate the application of certain practical conditions. A clarification/description was requested of the terms of a Nation and the People.
Prior clarification and interpretation by the General Assembly on certain issues is required before Articles 73 and 76. So far no action has been taken. The authors recommend that we are very cautious in applying these two concepts and point out different disadvantages, different points of view. In summary: The above-mentioned principle has acquired practical legal significance and has not taken on the status of a positive rule of law. As an ideal principle, moral value prevalent in the world is an unquestionable and sacred concept sought by states to use as a weapon in the service of their political antics.
When the subject becomes the subject of international debate, it is not useless to ask this question: Can the right to self-determination be accepted at all times and everywhere so that a people of a non-homogeneous country can relinquish their political independence and freedom to another state? If this is a rule, then there are situations that are exceptionally falsified. Austria after the first and second world war has been deprived of the legal capacity to unite with Germany. There are reasons that come to mind for Austria and many more as regards to Cyprus. When a powerful nation and state of 8-10 million situated in the middle of Europe and whose population in its entirety speak German and is considered to be of German origin, is bound by such falsification, they -the non Greek (Ρωμαϊκά στοιχεία) elements in the “huge” island of Cyprus may be deprived of their independence, because that is the wish of the provisional majority.
This view must not be overlooked against the desire for Union. Various other international examples can easily be added. Although this issue is clear, if self-government or self-determination is implemented in Cyprus in a manner we do not want, for reasons related to the political antics of the Greeks at the United Nations and the well-known rifts between its members, ιf possible the views expressed above in respect of Articles 73 and 76 could be added by way of a clause of reservation as to the rejection of the decision so that we do not reject the decision.
These first observations and thoughts I submit to your Excellency with my respect. Political assessment rests with your Excellency.
November 24, 1956
Professor Nihat Erim”
The second report (excerpt)
According to Erim’s memoirs, the first report aroused great interest, both for the Prime Minister and the President of the country, Celâl Bayar, as it was the first time that Turkish diplomacy had in front of it a complete plan for the promotion of its interests in Cyprus. He states: "The first report provoked a change in the government in terms of the legal basis on which our policy on the Cyprus issue should be based, as later expressed by Menderes himself. The government adopted the report and asked me to participate in the next phases of the development of the issue ".
On December 19, 1956, Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals for the Cyprus issue were submitted as part of the British proposal for self-government. Following Radcliff’s proposals, the Turkish government requested a second report from Nihat Erim, which included the Turkish positions on the proposals. On December 22, 1956, Erim sent his second report to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Its main points were the following:
"We should not forget even temporarily that the objective of the Greeks of Cyprus and Greece, whom they call Mother - Homeland, is the Union and will consider the proposals (meaning the British) as a stage to achieve their goal. It is very difficult to get this aim out of their minds. That is why we must look for new forms of solution in order to have peace on the island. For the security of Turkey, also for the security of the Baghdad Agreement (CENTO) and for the security of NATO, Cyprus holds a geographical position that should not be overlooked by anyone. Today they say the island is inhabited by 380 thousand Greeks, 100 thousand Turks and 20 thousand English and Maronites. In the past, the composition of the population was different than it is today. In 1877 the Turks on the island were more than the Greeks. Consequently, the current analogy cannot be valid forever and thus no one can argue that the population will remain unchanged and that this is a cause for political claims.
Therefore, because at some point in time and in the course of history, one population compared to the other was one hundred or two hundred thousand larger, there is no constant reason to permanently determine the fate of a large island such as Cyprus. Especially considering that such an island could pose an extremely high risk to the security of a state of 25 million people such as Turkey. It is an inevitable necessity to compare the 380 thousand not with the 100 thousand, but with the 25 million. With these thoughts in mind, we have tried to make it clear that, even if no apparent reason existed, the Radcliffe plan, does not enable us to reach a final solution on the part of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.
…………………
Turkey should insist that the same right for self-determination should be granted to the Turkish Cypriots just as to the Greek Cypriots. It is not possible to call for a joint referendum of two different communities that are neither homogeneous nor in solidarity, as if they were a single community. One community cannot and does not have the right to seduce the other. ………………….
Furthermore, Cyprus, in terms of the defence of, is a platform for attack, which can prove to be extremely dangerous. On the other hand, one cannot imagine a similar danger to Greece from Cyprus. How can one overlook this? It cannot fit into any political or legal perception. If we abandon Cyprus, it is very likely that the island will play a vital role in determining the fate of 25 million Turks, in one or the other system of government, as demanded by the Greek majority, in other words because 380 thousand people asked for it against 25 million.
In addition, the Treaty of Lausanne has created a fragile balance between Turkey and Greece, based on a general resolve of differences. In case Cyprus is abandoned to the desire of the Greek inhabitants of the island, this balance can be upset.
………………
In order to ensure a solution as stated at the beginning of the report, i.e the achievement of the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey or, if this is not achieved, the partition of Cyprus, we must also insist on the following elements, as a preparatory stage (Erim meant partition):
1. There must be provision in the Radcliffe constitution in which the Turks and the Greeks (Ρωμιοί), and the British if they so wish, are free to come from abroad and settle on the island.
2. It is argued by some that the majority of land ownership in Cyprus belongs to the Turks. We need to get a complete picture of this.
3. A demographic map must be drawn up which determines the number of Turks on the island as they are distributed in each town, and village.
4. We must gather the best possible information about the Cypriots of Turkey and in general all those outside Cyprus (here Erim was thinking of bringing settlers to the island to increase the Turkish population.)
The evaluation of this report belongs to Your Excellency.
December 22, 1956
Professor Nihat Erim”
Conclusion
With the creation of the independent Cypriot state, Turkey, through the constitution, managed to transform and legitimize the Turkish minority as a community and through the veto of the vice-president equated it with the Greek majority. In addition, through the treaty of Guarantee and the treaty of Alliance, Turkey succeeded in excluding the Union of Cyprus with Greece, succeeded in becoming (Turkey) one of the guarantor forces of the Republic of Cyprus, (succeeded) in having a permanent military detachment on the island, to participate through the tripartite headquarters in Cyprus in the planning and defence of Cyprus and to secure the so-called "invading right" of the guarantor powers.
In 1974, Turkey implemented the third pillar of the Nihat Erim’s report, namely the use of force to impose geographical segregation and the simultaneous movement of populations. Ever since, Turkey systematically followed a coercive strategy:
a) strengthening its position by creating legal basis, (e.g. attempting to legitimize its presence in Cyprus, either by recognition of the pseudo-state or by creating a Turkish Cypriot state in the north, which Turkey aims to control even after the solution by controlling the Turkish Cypriot political elite),
b) Turkey weakens the Republic of Cyprus by undermining its legal foundations (e.g. by the constant challenges Ankara raises against the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus and at times to its choices to exercise its legal rights for the defence of the country),
c) Turkey forces Cyprus to retreat under the threat of war (e.g. the S300 crisis, where it achieved to impose its will on the final decision of the Republic of Cyprus threatening to use armed force) and
d) through psychological warfare Turkey managed to impose the perception on the Greek side that the cost of war will be small for Turkey because the weak party (Cyprus) is not in a position to raise real resistance (e.g. Greece and Cyprus, following 1974 failed to establish a strong doctrine of strategic deterrent against Turkish aggression).
In conclusion, and although this report was drafted in 1956, linking for Turkish diplomacy the management of the Cyprus issue with the security of Turkey and its geostrategic aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 61 years after, remains topical and a document of great strategic importance, due to the consistency and stability with which the Turkish governments have followed it.
By placing this document of high strategy in a historical perspective of what took place in Cyprus from 1956 onwards, one can see that the characteristics of the Turkish strategy over the Cyprus issue were and remain the active support of its objectives, its coherence and efficiency.
Given the reality that Turkey has imposed on the island since 1974, it is now making it clear to international mediators that there are some limits within which it can make some "concessions", since it is negotiating from a position of power. This for the international mediators is a reality, which dictates the presentation of clearly more favourable plans for Turkey. And at the same time an attempt for Turkish strategy to implement the fifth pillar of the Nihat Erim’s report, i.e the solution within which the security system of the country will emerge will be controlled by Turkey.
Translated from Greek (by Christos Iacovou) to English to the best of my ability, as requested by Mr. Costas N. Hadjicostis of “Simerini”.
Fanoulla Argyrou Researcher/journalist/author
London
March 2022
