Strategic Foresight Report · iEpikaira · Global Power Shift
The Fragmentation of Primacy: Hegemonic Fatigue and the Rise of Transactional Multipolarity
The international system is not yet moving beyond American power, but it is increasingly moving beyond American-centred coordination. Domestic political constraints in Washington, the diminishing returns of coercive statecraft and the strategic diversification of middle powers are fragmenting the United States’ ability to organise the international system on its own terms. The emerging order is neither fully post-American nor defined by consolidated rival blocs. It is increasingly transactional, contested and distributed across overlapping regional power networks.
The global balance of power is not undergoing a smooth or linear transition. It is showing signs of fragmentation under the combined pressure of American strategic overextension, domestic political volatility and the deliberate hedging of middle powers. The Global Power Strategic Index (GPSI) places the United States at 89.76 and China at 88.05. The two countries remain the leading global powers, and their relative ranking has not yet undergone a major structural reversal. Yet the distribution of strategic leverage is changing in ways that cannot be captured by rankings alone.
Washington retains substantial military, financial, technological and diplomatic advantages. The strategic question, however, is increasingly whether it can convert these resources into uncontested political outcomes. At the same time, regional powers are seeking to reduce their dependence on a single security provider by diversifying partnerships, developing alternative arrangements and negotiating with competing centres of power.
1. Executive Assessment: The Post-Monocentric Reality
The principal development of the review period is the widening gap between the United States’ structural power and its ability to exercise that power without negotiating with other actors. American military reach, financial influence and technological advantages remain formidable. However, their political effectiveness is increasingly constrained by domestic polarisation, the economic costs of prolonged coercion and the practical difficulties of enforcing a global sanctions regime.
Three developments are particularly significant:
- The United States retains structural advantages, but faces greater political constraints. Domestic political volatility, the costs of prolonged overseas commitments and the difficulty of securing cooperation from third parties increasingly limit Washington’s ability to translate its material advantages into predictable international outcomes.
- Middle powers are pursuing strategic diversification. Regional actors are not necessarily forming anti-Western military blocs. Instead, they are developing overlapping and transactional security relationships to hedge against uncertainty in Washington and the limits of American enforcement capabilities.
- Coercive statecraft is encountering diminishing returns. US sanctions remain powerful, but sophisticated evasion networks and alternative commercial relationships make it increasingly difficult to isolate adversarial economies without the active cooperation of third countries.
The distinction between possessing power and converting it into political results is becoming central to the emerging international order. American capabilities remain unmatched in several dimensions, but their effectiveness increasingly depends on the willingness of allies, partners and even competitors to cooperate with Washington's objectives.
2. Scope, Methodology and the Limits of Measurement
This assessment draws on the GPSI daily country dataset and calibrated momentum snapshots covering 25 October – 9 November 2026. The index classifies the current geopolitical environment as an emerging multipolar balance, with medium confidence.
The GPSI provides a composite indication of short-term geopolitical relevance and relative strategic positioning. It should not be interpreted as a direct measurement of national power, military strength or the overall effectiveness of a country's foreign policy. Its results reflect a combination of underlying capabilities and observable geopolitical activity during the measurement period.
The index should therefore be read as a monitoring instrument rather than a predictive model. It helps identify changes in relative positioning and geopolitical momentum, but it cannot independently establish causation, measure every dimension of national power or determine the outcome of future crises.
Analytical reference: Global Power Shift Index (GPSI) dashboard.
3. How the Global Power Map Is Changing
A. The United States: Structural Primacy versus Political Fragmentation
The United States remains the premier global power, but its strategic posture is increasingly burdened by domestic political friction. The proposed transition away from the existing annual $3.8 billion military assistance arrangement with Israel towards a different form of defence-industrial partnership illustrates the political uncertainty surrounding long-term security commitments.
The existing memorandum of understanding does not expire until 2028, and any wind-down would require further political decisions. Nevertheless, the debate itself carries strategic significance. For allies, it reinforces the perception that American security commitments may become more closely tied to domestic political priorities, budgetary pressures and changes in the balance of power in Washington.
This does not mean that the United States is abandoning its regional commitments. It does, however, underline the growing importance of political conditionality in the exercise of American power. Allies must increasingly consider not only the capabilities Washington possesses, but also the domestic political conditions under which those capabilities are likely to be deployed.
A similar distinction is necessary when assessing American maritime activity around Iran. US pressure concerns Iranian ports and maritime commerce, alongside military activity around the Strait of Hormuz, rather than a blanket closure of the waterway itself. This distinction matters: projecting naval power in such a strategically sensitive area requires Washington to balance coercive pressure against the risk of triggering a much wider regional crisis and severe disruption to global energy markets.
B. The Limits of Coercion: Sanctions and Evasion Networks
US sanctions continue to represent one of Washington's most powerful instruments of statecraft. The imposition of new sanctions on Indian and Turkish entities on 4 November demonstrates that the United States retains considerable financial and regulatory leverage beyond its immediate alliance network.
However, the discovery of sophisticated networks facilitating Iranian sanctions evasion exposes the structural limits of enforcement. Commercial intermediaries, alternative trading routes and cross-border financial arrangements make it increasingly difficult to translate the announcement of sanctions into comprehensive economic isolation.
The challenge is not that American financial power has disappeared. It is that exercising this power effectively requires extensive cooperation from third parties. As middle powers become more adept at navigating sanctions regimes, Washington must expend greater diplomatic, intelligence and regulatory resources to preserve the effectiveness of economic coercion.
The result is a sanctions environment that remains influential but increasingly contested. Unilateral measures can impose substantial costs, yet they do not necessarily produce strategic isolation or political compliance.
C. The Middle East: Strategic Diversification, Not Anti-Western Blocs
The emerging defence arrangement involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan is a major regional development. It should, however, be understood primarily as an exercise in strategic diversification, rather than the formation of a consolidated anti-Western military bloc.
Turkey and Pakistan have explicitly stressed that the agreement is not directed against Iran or any other specific country. Syria has also expressed interest in joining the wider framework, although its participation remains under discussion. Any concrete deployment of forces would require additional political and parliamentary approvals.
The significance of the arrangement lies in the willingness of regional powers to develop security relationships beyond their traditional dependence on Washington. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have different interests and strategic priorities, and their cooperation should not be mistaken for the emergence of a unified geopolitical camp.
Rather, the agreement reflects a broader tendency: regional powers increasingly seek to retain multiple diplomatic and security options. They are not necessarily attempting to dismantle the Western alliance system. They are seeking greater bargaining power within an international environment in which no single external actor can be assumed to manage every regional security challenge.
D. Russia and Iran: Tactical Alignment and Asymmetric Leverage
Russia continues to exploit gaps in American enforcement and European strategic exhaustion in order to preserve its international relevance. Moscow has recently agreed to supply Iran with 90 helicopter missile launchers, potentially enhancing Tehran's asymmetric capabilities without necessarily involving the broader transfer of weapons systems that might cross more consequential Western red lines.
At the same time, Russia continues to use energy exports and hybrid instruments to impose costs on the transatlantic alliance. Cyber operations targeting European officials, including the Italian Foreign Minister, illustrate the continuing role of deniable and below-threshold activities in Moscow's strategic toolkit.
These actions should not obscure Russia's own structural weaknesses. Its economy faces significant constraints, while diplomatic isolation in forums such as the G20 limits its ability to shape international outcomes through conventional multilateral channels. Moscow's influence is therefore increasingly exercised through selective partnerships, asymmetric capabilities and the exploitation of divisions among its adversaries.
E. Europe and the Global South: Hedging as a Strategic Necessity
Europe's position remains mixed. European governments continue to participate in US-mediated discussions on Ukraine in Abu Dhabi, while simultaneously confronting increased vulnerability to hybrid operations, energy market volatility and uncertainty over the long-term direction of American policy.
In the Global South, India provides a particularly clear example of strategic hedging. Its pursuit of a long-term LNG agreement with the United Arab Emirates, reportedly covering ten years, illustrates how major regional powers seek to secure their economic interests while navigating the consequences of US secondary sanctions and broader geopolitical competition.
These developments do not necessarily indicate an ideological shift away from the West. They demonstrate a growing preference for strategic autonomy: the ability to maintain relations with competing powers, preserve access to markets and resources, and avoid becoming excessively dependent on a single geopolitical centre.
4. Implications for Greece and Cyprus
For Athens and Nicosia, the most consequential signal of the past two weeks is the accelerating diversification of Turkey's strategic partnerships. The Saudi–Turkey–Pakistan arrangement does not automatically constitute an anti-Western military bloc, but it could provide Ankara with additional diplomatic and defence relationships beyond the NATO framework.
This development should be assessed in the context of Turkey's broader effort to position itself as an indispensable regional actor. Its relationships with the Gulf states, Pakistan, Iran and other regional powers increase its diplomatic flexibility and potentially expand the range of external partners it can draw upon during a crisis.
- Strategic autonomy: Greece and Cyprus should not assume that American diplomatic intervention in regional disputes will be automatic or unconditional. They need to deepen their integration with European defence initiatives and strengthen bilateral relationships with regional middle powers. A wider network of partnerships can reduce vulnerability to shifts in Washington's domestic political priorities.
- Energy vulnerability: As American policy increasingly reflects domestic energy priorities, Eastern Mediterranean energy corridors need to be supported by durable European and regional partnerships. Their resilience should not depend exclusively on the political calculations of external powers or on the uninterrupted operation of vulnerable maritime routes.
- Maritime security: The reported sinking of a Greek tanker off Bulgaria highlights the exposure of commercial shipping to maritime insecurity. The normalisation of attacks on commercial vessels requires stronger European-led maritime awareness, surveillance and defensive coordination in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
The central implication is that Greece and Cyprus must prepare for a more transactional international environment. Diplomatic support will increasingly depend on the alignment of interests, the practical value of partnerships and the ability of states to contribute to regional security. European and regional cooperation therefore needs to acquire more operational substance.
5. Forward Outlook: Conditional Scenarios, 10–30 November 2026
The next 30 days are likely to be shaped by the interaction between a politically constrained Washington and a more diversified, opportunistic international environment. The following scenarios are conditional analytical pathways derived from the current indicators. They are not predictions or mutually exclusive outcomes.
Scenario 1. Managed Escalation and Tactical De-escalation
The United States maintains targeted pressure on Iranian ports and maritime commerce while using Qatari and Pakistani mediation channels to prevent a broader regional war. Oil markets stabilise, but the security architecture of the Gulf continues to evolve as regional powers deepen their own defence arrangements.
Strategic implication: A temporary reduction in immediate tensions would not reverse the longer-term diversification of regional security relationships. The Gulf could become less dependent on exclusive American security management even without a direct confrontation with Washington.
Scenario 2. Fragmentation of Coercive Leverage
Domestic political paralysis in the United States, including post-midterm gridlock and renewed disputes over fiscal and debt-ceiling issues, limits Washington's ability to maintain a coherent response to sanctions evasion. Middle powers increasingly use alternative payment mechanisms and non-dollar settlement arrangements to reduce their exposure to American financial pressure.
Strategic implication: The weaponisation of the US dollar would not disappear, but its effectiveness could become more conditional. Washington might be forced to accept a more plural financial environment in which its sanctions remain powerful but are less capable of producing comprehensive economic isolation.
Scenario 3. Institutionalisation of Regional Balancing
The Saudi–Pakistan–Turkey arrangement moves from diplomatic ratification towards practical implementation, potentially through joint procurement agreements, intelligence-sharing arrangements, naval exercises or elements of coordinated air-defence cooperation.
Strategic implication: Such developments would not necessarily trigger a direct confrontation with the West. They could, however, reduce the exclusivity of American security management in the Arabian Peninsula and increase the bargaining power of regional actors.
6. How to Prepare: Navigating the Post-Monocentric Transition
States must prepare for an international environment in which American actions are increasingly shaped by domestic constraints, while allies are expected to assume greater responsibility for their own security. This does not require disengagement from the United States. It requires the development of greater national resilience, a wider diplomatic network and the capacity to operate across multiple centres of power.
- Sanctions compliance and financial exposure: Develop legal and financial safeguards against the effects of extraterritorial sanctions, while strengthening monitoring of sanctions-evasion networks that could expose national banks, companies and financial intermediaries to US Treasury penalties. Strategic autonomy must not become an excuse for ignoring compliance obligations.
- Security architecture: Treat external security guarantees as politically conditional rather than permanently automatic. The debates surrounding the Israel–US military assistance framework illustrate the importance of domestic political decisions in Washington. Accelerate defence integration, improve national capabilities and establish durable bilateral arrangements with regional partners.
- Energy resilience: Reduce excessive dependence on politically vulnerable energy routes and suppliers. Diversify supply sources, reinforce critical infrastructure and develop long-term arrangements with regional producers. Energy security should be based on resilience and multiple options rather than assumptions about the permanence of any one geopolitical relationship.
- Cyber and hybrid defence: Prepare for an increase in cyber and hybrid operations conducted below the threshold of conventional military retaliation. Critical infrastructure, government networks, energy facilities and communications systems must be protected against both deliberate hostile activity and the wider technological disruption associated with US–China decoupling.
For European states in particular, the objective should be to increase their capacity to act collectively without weakening the transatlantic relationship. A more capable European security framework would improve the credibility of the alliance, reduce strategic vulnerabilities and provide greater flexibility when American political priorities change.
7. Strategic Watchlist: Indicators of Systemic Shift
The following indicators should be monitored during the coming weeks. Their value lies not in any single event, but in the cumulative evidence they may provide about the pace and practical depth of multipolar balancing.
- Operationalisation of the Mecca Pact: Watch for joint procurement agreements, intelligence-sharing frameworks, common defence planning or coordinated naval exercises involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. These would provide stronger evidence of institutional development than diplomatic declarations alone.
- Syrian integration: Monitor whether Damascus moves beyond expressing interest and towards formal participation in the emerging regional defence framework. Any such development would need to be assessed against the relevant domestic and parliamentary approval processes.
- Hormuz insurance rates: Track whether maritime insurers begin treating the presence of US naval escorts as an additional escalation-related liability rather than solely as a protective factor. Changes in insurance pricing could provide an early indication of how markets assess the security environment.
- Sanctions enforcement yield: Assess the volume and scope of bilateral trade settled in non-US dollar currencies, particularly in relationships such as India–UAE and Turkey–Iran. The relevant question is whether these arrangements remain limited hedging mechanisms or become more systematic alternatives to dollar-based transactions.
- Abu Dhabi diplomacy: Evaluate the substance of European participation in US-mediated Ukraine talks. The key indicator will be whether Washington is prepared to accommodate European preferences or cede diplomatic ground in pursuit of a managed or frozen conflict.
8. Final Judgement: The Fragmentation of Primacy
The world is not yet post-American, but it is increasingly post-monocentric. The United States retains structural advantages across several dimensions of power, yet its ability to translate those advantages into uncontested political outcomes is becoming more dependent on negotiation, transactional alliances and the cooperation of regional actors.
What is emerging is not the collapse of American primacy, but the fragmentation of the United States' ability to operate as the uncontested organiser of the international system. The distinction is fundamental. Washington remains the strongest actor, but it increasingly has to negotiate the terms under which it can exercise its power.
Its capacity to unilaterally shape global systems is being contested by middle powers that are building parallel or overlapping arrangements: the Saudi–Pakistan–Turkey defence framework, the Russia–Iran arms relationship and the India–UAE energy axis. These arrangements do not constitute a single alternative bloc. Their strategic significance lies in the additional choices they provide to states seeking to insulate themselves from American political and economic volatility.
The resulting order is likely to be more fragmented and transactional. States will continue to cooperate with Washington where their interests align, while simultaneously cultivating relationships with competing powers. Alignment will become more selective, issue-specific and reversible. This will make international diplomacy more complex and the management of regional crises more dependent on continuous bargaining.
Strategic Implication: De-risking from Unpredictability
The imperative for states is not to disengage from the United States, nor to assume that American power is in irreversible decline. It is to reduce excessive dependence on the political decisions of any single external actor.
For allies, this means strengthening national capabilities, diversifying diplomatic and economic relationships, protecting critical infrastructure and building regional mechanisms that can function even when Washington is politically constrained. For middle powers, it means preserving room for manoeuvre without assuming that every new partnership will mature into a reliable strategic commitment.
The emerging international system will not necessarily be less American. It will, however, be less exclusively organised around American preferences. The ability to navigate this transition will depend on whether states can convert strategic diversification into durable capabilities rather than simply accumulating diplomatic declarations.
The central judgement is therefore clear: the strategic priority is to de-risk from American unpredictability without mistaking diversification for independence or assuming that the era of American power has ended.
Analytical basis: GPSI daily country dataset and calibrated momentum snapshots, 25 October – 9 November 2026. The report assesses relative geopolitical positioning and strategic developments; it should not be interpreted as a direct measurement of national power or as a prediction of future events.
For further information and daily data, visit the Global Power Shift Index (GPSI) dashboard.
Prepared by iEpikaira.
.png)
