29/05/2023
The Greek-Turkish maritime relations could evolve towards a positive and pragmatic turning point. Press sources they talk about one mediation of Germany to induce Greece and Turkey, under pressure from the United States, to resolve their disputes. The news could be credible, considering that Berlin had already spent itself in the past to mitigate the friction between the two parties.
An unprecedented favorable situation is now looming: the two contenders are starting a new internal political phase after the elections, which could facilitate an abandonment of the traditional nationalist maritime rhetoric and one greater attention to the exploitation of the energy resources of the domestic seas. Turkey would also use gas from the Mediterranean by loosening relations with Russia to which it is linked by pipelines from the Black Sea.
It is significant that the Chief Executive Officer of Eni Claudio Descalzi has recently declared: “We cannot think that an agreement can be found between Israel, Cyprus and Greece for a pipe, without Ankara participating”; with this implying that the Turkish consent to the realization of EastMed, from an inclusive economic perspective, it is not impossible.
The dispute over the Sea of Islands
There are many disputes between Athens and Ankara at sea since with the art. 12 and 13 of Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, all the islands in front of Turkey were assigned to Greece, with demilitarization constraints, except those located “less than 3 mg. from the Asian coast” and at the entrance of the Dardanellesas well as the Dodecanese and Kastellorizo attributed to Italy.
The question of the “weight” of these islands in the boundaries of the continental shelf and of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is seen, on the basis of an uncertain regulation of the Law of the Sea Convention (Unclos), in an antithetical way: Turkey is for the reduced effect to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; Greece is staunchly supporting their maximum maritime projection regardless of size. Both countries underestimate the principles of proportionality which, according to Unclos, should lead to fair results.
The paradigm of these opposing visions is the small Kastellorizo, which passed to Greece in 1947, 350 mg away from the motherland. but attached to Türkiye. Athens has made it the pivot of its claims up to the center of Eastern Mediterranean which deny Ankara, for the purposes of the surface area of the EEZ, the just relevance of the extensive Anatolian coast. The approach of Cyprus is similar, which in 2003 already divided part of the EEZ claimed by Turkey with Egypt. As a reaction, Ankara concluded in 2019 with Tripoli a disputed boundary agreement which borders the territorial waters of Crete and Karpatos.
If the rumors of an imminent start of negotiations were confirmed, it would be necessary to see if it is a “package” that includes reciprocal concessions. In the Aegean, it would not be easy for Turkey to accept the jurisdiction of International Court of Justice which he refused fifty years ago by ignoring a Security Council resolution; among other things, the Turkish position was conditioned by the non-membership of the Unclos and by the problem of the demilitarization of the Greek islands. Therefore, it is easier to imagine a transitory solution such as the joint exploration and exploitation of areas offshore also claimed by Greece.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, the revocation of the unscrupulous Turkish-Libyan Agreement of 2019 (already overshadowed last year) would unlock many issues: Greece and Libya could delimit their respective EEZs and so would Turkey and Egypt. Moreover, it is known that Cairo left the door open to this solution when in 2020 it concluded an agreement with Athens that does not affect the area of Turkish interest. Also in this quadrant there are substantial reserves of gas.
In short, it is not certain that the delays and procedural games of an arbitration court are really the best choice, when instead the immense energy resources to be shared immediately offer the possibility of pragmatic commercial agreements, advantageous for all the parties involved.
This is where the question of EastMed: its realization could be unlocked if Turkey, by connecting to the infrastructure, agrees to a route that crosses the EEZs bordered with Cyprus, Egypt and Greece. In this way, US reserves would fall, also considering the company’s anti-Russian aims. Prejudicial is obviously the solution of the problem of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
The lesson for Italy
From the possible positive turning point of the Greek-Turkish dispute, indications are given us to face some disputes with our neighbors. At stake for us too is the exploitation of the living, renewable and mineral resources of the Zee. For example, it seems that west of Sardinia, just where Algeria in 2018 he unilaterally proclaimed his EEZ (which we disputed), there are huge gas deposits.
Possible limits of the Italian EEZ assuming a coincidence with those of the continental shelf (map taken from: Ministry of Economic Development, Il Mare, 2013, 27)
Why not think then of pragmatic joint solutions of a provisional nature? And why not do it with Malta with whom negotiations have been dragging on for fifty years? And what about the uncertainty of the border of the Libyan fisheries protection zone which is the cause of many accidents and which it would not be so difficult to make the subject of an informal understanding? Stalemate on these issues risks making our just claims on the seas of Italy unrealistic.
At a time when the newly established Ministry of the Sea drafting of the “Sea Plan”, it would then be logical to expect the definition of strategic guidelines to make the framework legislation on the EEZ. Until the necessary implementing decrees are issued which fix the borders (even provisional for the disputed areas) and regulate the matters of jurisdiction – above all, renewable energies, environmental protection, contrasting irregular fishing – the Italian EEZ will be yet another unfinished business.
Source: https://www.breakinglatest.news/business/greece-and-turkiye-maritime-realpolitik-on-the-horizon/
