Max Hoffman
OVERVIEW
Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy should be met with firm transactionalism by the Biden administration, and while this stance is unlikely to change President Erdoğan’s unilateral approach, it could help preserve certain institutional ties.
Introduction and summary
Relations between Turkey and its Western allies in the United States and Europe have been on a steady downward trajectory for some eight years. While Presidents Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan established a measure of rapport, their highly personalized dealings only papered over the structural differences undermining the relationship. With President Joe Biden unlikely to continue Trump’s laissez-faire approach, several of these simmering disagreements could bubble over in 2021 and lead to a deeper rupture in relations. Beyond the change of tone and approach from a new U.S. administration, several key strategic and energy decisions could determine Turkey’s direction for years to come.
Indeed, with Turkey militarily engaged in Syria, Iraq, and Libya—and at loggerheads with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and France over Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries and potential energy resources—there is no shortage of potential flashpoints. The possibility that Turkey will fully activate the S-400 air defense system purchased from Russia or pursue deeper cooperation with Moscow in response to U.S. sanctions continues to threaten the strategic relationship. The separate threat of sanctions against Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank for evading Iran sanctions hangs over the already-weakened Turkish economy. The lira’s weakness and Turkey’s persistent current account deficit, coupled with Ankara’s exhaustion of its foreign currency reserves, could lead to further economic turbulence and, potentially, greater repression from President Erdoğan of his domestic critics. In Libya, a fragile ceasefire has so far held back a new phase of that internationalized conflict, but Turkey stands against an array of regional players in supporting the U.N.-recognized government. The Libyan conflict is now also tied into a broader standoff between Turkey and its Hellenic neighbors over Cyprus, maritime delineation, and energy exploration.
In northern Syria, frequent skirmishes along tense, complicated lines of control hold the risk of escalation into direct clashes with the Assad regime, Russia, and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. And in Nagorno-Karabakh, the map of the Caucasus has been rapidly recast, with Turkey and Russia once again facing off—and both sides’ observers and proxy forces in close proximity along a disputed boundary. Hanging over all these issues is Turkey’s assertive, independent foreign policy line under President Erdoğan and his close, if fraught, coordination with Russian President Vladimir Putin—trends that have led many in the U.S. government to question whether Turkey remains a fully committed ally.
This report discusses the conditions that could shape U.S.-Turkey relations under the new administration before outlining possible flashpoints and trying to provide a risk outlook for 2021. While these challenges overlap and influence one another—President Erdoğan’s decision on the S-400, for example, could shape the U.S. posture on other issues—they can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; 2) defense procurement and strategic alignment; and 3) regional conflicts and revanchism. The complexity of these problems and the speed at which they are changing makes it difficult to offer comprehensive recommendations. Likewise, a single, unified approach—as satisfying as that might be—cannot fit all these different situations. Nonetheless, this report seeks to offer some ideas to guide responses to 2021’s flashpoints.
The United States has significant leverage with Turkey, a NATO ally whose economic and military security is largely dependent on its Western allies. Four of Turkey’s top-five export markets in 2019—and eight of the top 10—are NATO members.1 Still, the U.S. interest is in a stable and democratic Turkey that is part of NATO and able to help confront Russia, manage the refugee crisis, and work with Washington in the Middle East. The Biden administration, like those before it, will have to balance these core interests with the fact that overly punitive steps could cripple Turkey’s economy while doing little to strengthen its democracy and pushing Ankara toward Moscow. The United States cannot therefore be hard-line on every front with Turkey. Nor can U.S. or European pressure save Turkey from Erdoğan; the Turkish president is not going to change his stripes or significantly moderate his domestic repression under duress. But Turkey will hold an election in 2023 or before, and there is a real chance that Erdoğan will lose. The United States and Europe can therefore seek to coordinate to signal clear red lines and credible responses to deter further Turkish escalation. In order to have an effect, these responses must be significant and must be enforced, but they should ideally be easily reversible.
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