Turkey’s energy hub ambitions have new momentum after Assad’s fall
Assad’s departure could help Turkey become a key point of transit for natural gas. But renewable energy may offer the more promising avenue for cooperation with a new Syrian regime.
Karim Elgendy, Associate Fellow, Environment and Society Centre
17/12/24
The sudden collapse of the 54-year Assad dynasty in Syria has opened possibilities for a new regional order. Much remains uncertain, but Turkey – which has hosted most of Syria’s refugees and backed the winning side – is in a leading position to shape that future.
The cost of Syrian reconstruction is estimated to reach $400 billion, and Turkish companies are well-placed to secure major contracts should Syria’s state-led economy transform into a free market.
Diplomatically, Ankara could leverage its support for Syrian rebels to negotiate favourable defence agreements with the new government in Damascus – potentially replicating similar agreements it has with Azerbaijan, Qatar, Somalia, and Libya. Such arrangements would significantly expand Turkey’s strategic depth in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Maritime boundary delimitation presents another crucial opportunity. A new Syrian government might be more amenable to recognizing Turkish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZs) claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, strengthening Ankara’s position in ongoing disputes with Greece and Cyprus.
This could include both Turkish claims and those of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – a de facto state recognized only by Ankara.
An opportunity to reshape Eastern Mediterranean energy architecture
These opportunities have emerged at a time when Ankara is making a renewed push to establish Turkey as the region’s premier energy hub.
These reinvigorated ambitions were on full display at a major energy summit in Istanbul last month. Turkish officials hosted ministers from key gas producers including Azerbaijan, Libya, and Uzbekistan, alongside representatives from transit countries like Georgia and Eastern European importers. Ankara’s vision is that Turkey will serve as the key transit point between gas producers to its east and south, and markets to its west.
Its existing energy infrastructure provides a good foundation for these ambitions. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, which forms part of the Southern Gas Corridor bringing Azerbaijani gas to Europe, already demonstrates Turkey’s suitability as a transit nation. The country also has seven gas pipelines, five LNG terminals, three floating storage units, and two underground storage facilities – as well as significant excess import capacity that could be used for trading.
The possibility for a new, stable Syrian state creates an opportunity for Turkey to capitalize on this potential. By creating a gas pipeline to the west of Syria and connecting to the existing Arab Gas Pipeline network (which links Syria, Jordan, and Egypt) Turkey could offer regional gas producers such as Israel and Egypt a more commercially viable route to European markets than current LNG alternatives.
This would effectively challenge the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) – an alliance that includes Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Palestine, Jordan, Italy, and France.
The EMGF’s flagship EastMed Pipeline project has struggled with technical and financial viability, with its proposed 1,900-kilometer deepwater pipeline connecting Israel and Cyprus to Greece making little progress. The pipeline was also dealt a significant blow when the US withdrew support in 2022.
A land-based route through Syria to Turkey’s existing infrastructure would provide a shorter, technically simpler, and more cost-effective alternative. This could also present a future opportunity for Lebanon, which recently began offshore exploration work and lacks export infrastructure of its own. Lebanon is not a member of the EMGF and could find a Turkish route especially attractive if its gas exploration efforts prove successful.
Additionally, stability in Syria could allow the revival of the long-dormant pipeline project to connect Qatari natural gas fields with Turkey via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. The plan had been rejected by the Assad regime, reportedly to protect Russian gas exports into European markets. It took the Turkish energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, just two days after Assad’s fall to publicly express openness to revisiting the plan.
Beyond fossil fuels
Notably, Bayraktar has also signalled Ankara’s interest in collaborating with Syria on energy reconstruction beyond fossil fuels.
Turkey has enjoyed considerable success expanding its renewable energy network – 43 per cent of electricity in the country was generated through a combination of wind, solar, and hydroelectric power in 2023 – providing a practical blueprint for Syria’s post-war energy development.
This model is particularly relevant given Syria’s abundant solar resources and urgent need to rebuild its power generation capacity to fuel economic development.
A Turkish-Syrian grid integration would serve as a crucial node in an emerging Eastern Mediterranean electricity network. Such infrastructure would help manage renewable energy intermittency and position Turkey as the northern anchor of a growing regional power system.
The network’s other components – the Egypt-Saudi Arabia Inter-connector, the Great Sea Inter-connector (Israel-Cyprus-Greece), and the GREGY Inter-connector (Egypt-Greece) – collectively represent an emerging power architecture that could transform regional energy security and support the integration of renewables. It could also foster economic cooperation and help reduce geopolitical tensions through increased interdependence.
Structural challenges and strategic opportunities
Turkey’s strategic opening after Assad’s fall presents both opportunities and strategic choices.
The emerging regional power architecture, while promising, faces significant structural and market challenges. The establishment of a stable, internationally recognized government in Syria remains uncertain.
Even with a favourable political outcome in Syria, Turkey faces a critical decision: whether to pursue traditional gas hub ambitions that may face diminishing returns, seeking influence through traditional pipeline politics – or to leverage this moment to position itself at the centre of the region’s clean energy transition.
Turkey’s gas hub aspirations face headwinds. Europe’s demand for gas will decline beyond 2030 and international financiers have a reduced appetite for investments in fossil fuel infrastructure.
Prioritizing sustainable energy over conventional gas networks seems the best method by which Turkey could transform its temporary strategic advantage into lasting regional influence.
Regardless, the choices Ankara makes in the coming months will be pivotal for its future as a regional hub – and for the entire Eastern Mediterranean energy landscape.
[iEpikaira: Το βρετανικό think tank Chatham House που έχει στενές σχέσεις με τη Βρετανική κυβέρνηση και τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες, επιβεβαιώνει τα όσα σχολιάστηκαν ΕΔΩ και ΕΔΩ και ΕΔΩ και ΕΔΩ και ΕΔΩ!]
Source: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/turkeys-energy-hub-ambitions-have-new-momentum-after-assads-fall
